



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
SECRETARY OF STATE (by hand)  
DIRECTOR FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: National Defense and Military Strategies

Attached are the draft National Defense and Military Strategies for your review. I would like to issue the documents promptly. Doug Feith and Ryan Henry are available to brief you.

I would appreciate your comments as soon as possible.

cc: White House Chief of Staff

381

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**PRELIMINARY WORKING DRAFT**

# **National Defense Strategy of The United States of America**



**PRELIMINARY WORKING DRAFT**

## Table of Contents

FOREWORD .....	iii
I. AMERICA'S SECURITY IN THE 21 <sup>ST</sup> CENTURY .....	1
A. AMERICA'S ROLE IN THE WORLD .....	1
B. A CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT .....	1
II. A DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR THE 21 <sup>ST</sup> CENTURY .....	6
A. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES .....	6
B. HOW WE ACCOMPLISH OUR OBJECTIVES .....	7
C. IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES .....	9
III. DESIRED CAPABILITIES AND ATTRIBUTES .....	12
A. KEY OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES .....	12
B. ATTRIBUTES .....	16



## FOREWORD

We live in a time of unconventional challenges and strategic uncertainty. We are confronting fundamentally different challenges from those faced by the American defense establishment in the Cold War and previous eras. The strategy we adopt today will help influence the world's strategic environment, for the United States is an unusually powerful player in world affairs. President George W. Bush is committed to ensuring the security of the American people, strengthening the community of free nations, and advancing democratic reform, freedom, and economic well-being around the globe.

The Department of Defense is implementing the President's commitment to the forward defense of freedom. This *National Defense Strategy* outlines our approach to dealing with challenges we likely will confront, not just those we are currently best prepared to meet. Our intent is to create favorable security conditions around the world and to continue to transform how we think about security, formulate strategic objectives, and adapt to achieve success.

This strategy emphasizes the importance of influencing events before challenges become more dangerous and less manageable. It builds upon efforts in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) to develop an adaptable, global approach that acknowledges the limits of our intelligence (in all senses of the term), anticipates surprises, and positions us to handle strategic uncertainty.

Since the QDR was released, events have confirmed the importance of assuring allies and friends, dissuading potential adversaries, deterring aggression and coercion, and defeating adversaries. The war on terrorism has exposed new challenges, but also unprecedented strategic opportunities to work at home and with allies and partners abroad to create conditions favorable to a secure international order.

When President Bush took office three years ago, he gave us the mission to prepare the Department of Defense to meet 21<sup>st</sup>-century challenges. This strategy is designed to fulfill that mission. Knowing the dedication and capabilities of our uniformed men and women and of the civilians who support them, I am confident we will succeed.



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

America is a nation at war. We face a diverse set of security challenges. Yet, we still live in an era of advantage and opportunity.

The *National Defense Strategy* outlines an active, layered approach to the defense of the nation and its interests. It seeks to create conditions conducive to a secure international order favorable to freedom, democracy, and economic opportunity. This strategy promotes close cooperation with others around the world that are committed to these goals. It addresses mature and emerging threats.

## STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

**Secure the United States from direct attack.** We will give top priority to dissuading, deterring, and defeating those who seek to harm the U.S. directly.

**Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action.** We will promote the security, prosperity, and freedom of action of the United States and its partners by securing access to key regions, lines of communication and the global commons.

**Strengthen alliances and partnerships.** We will expand the community of like-minded nations and help partners increase their capacity to defend themselves and collectively meet challenges to our common interests.

**Establish favorable security conditions.** We will create conditions conducive to a favorable international system by honoring our security commitments and working with others to bring about a common appreciation of threats; a broad, secure, and lasting peace; and the steps required to protect against these threats.

## HOW WE ACCOMPLISH OUR OBJECTIVES

**Assure allies and friends.** We will provide assurance by demonstrating our resolve to fulfill our defense commitments and help protect common interests.

**Dissuade potential adversaries.** We will work to dissuade potential adversaries from adopting threatening capabilities, methods, and ambitions, particularly by developing our own key military advantages.

**Deter aggression and counter coercion.** We will deter by maintaining capable and rapidly deployable military forces and, when necessary, demonstrating the will to decisively resolve conflicts on favorable terms.

**Defeat adversaries.** At the direction of the President, we will defeat adversaries at the time, place and in the manner of our choosing – setting the conditions for future security.

## IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES

Four guidelines structure our strategic planning and decision-making.

**Active, layered defense.** We will focus our military planning, posture, operations, and capabilities on the active, forward, and layered defense of our nation, our interests, and our partners.

**Continuous transformation.** We will continually adapt how we approach and confront challenges, conduct business, and work with others.

**Capabilities-based approach.** We will strengthen our opportunity-oriented approach for addressing mature and emerging challenges — setting priorities among competing capabilities.

**Managing risks.** We will consider the full range of risks associated with resources and operations and manage explicit tradeoffs across the Department.



# NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

## I. AMERICA'S SECURITY IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY

### A. AMERICA'S ROLE IN THE WORLD

America is a nation at war. We face a diverse set of security challenges.

Yet, we still live in an era of advantage and opportunity. We also possess uniquely effective military capabilities that we are seeking to transform to meet future challenges.

As directed by the President in his 2002 *National Security Strategy*, we will use our position "to build a safer, better world that favors human freedom, democracy, and free enterprise." Our security and that of our international partners—our allies and friends—is based on a common commitment to peace, freedom, and economic opportunity. In cooperation with our international partners, we can build a more peaceful and secure international order.

Despite our strategic advantages, we are vulnerable to challenges ranging from direct attacks to indirect threats posed by aggression and dangerous instability affecting others. Some enemies may seek to terrorize our population and destroy our way of life, while others will try to 1) limit our global freedom to act, 2) dominate key regions or 3) attempt to make prohibitive the costs of various U.S. international commitments.

The United States follows a strategy that aims to preserve and extend peace, freedom and prosperity throughout the world.

The attacks of 9/11 gave us greater clarity on the challenges that confront us. U.S. officials and the public saw then that, without resolute

U.S. action, even more harmful attacks would likely occur in the future. A reactive or defensive approach would not allow the U.S. to secure itself and preserve our way of life as a free and open society. Thus, the United States is committed to an active defense of the nation and its interests. This new approach is evident in the war on terrorism.

The U.S. and its partners have made progress in the war on terrorism through an unprecedented level of international cooperation. Over 170 countries are engaged in activities ranging from freezing terrorist assets to sharing intelligence to providing combat forces for coalition operations. In Afghanistan, a multinational coalition defeated a regime that provided one of the world's principal havens for terrorists. In Iraq, an American-led effort toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein—a tyrant who used WMD, supported terrorists, terrorized his population and threatened his neighbors.

Experience in the war on terrorism has underscored the need for a changed defense establishment—one postured both for extended conflict and continuous transformation. This demands an adaptive strategy, predicated on creating and seizing opportunities and contending with challenges through an active, layered defense of the nation and its interests.

### B. A CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Uncertainty is the defining characteristic of today's strategic environment. We can identify trends but cannot predict specific events with precision. While we work to avoid being surprised, we must posture ourselves to handle unanticipated problems—we must plan with surprise in mind.

We contend with uncertainty by adapting to circumstances and influencing events. It is not enough to react to change. This strategy focuses on safeguarding U.S. freedoms and



interests while working actively to forestall the emergence of new challenges.

## 1. MATURE AND EMERGING CHALLENGES

“America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few.” – *National Security Strategy, September 2002*

The U.S. military predominates in the world in *traditional* forms of warfare. Potential adversaries accordingly shift away from challenging the U.S. through *traditional* military action and adopt asymmetric capabilities and methods. An array of *traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive* capabilities and methods threaten U.S. interests:

- **Traditional** challenges are posed by states employing recognized military capabilities and forces in well-understood forms of military competition and conflict.
- **Irregular** challenges come from those employing “unconventional” methods to counter the *traditional* advantages of stronger opponents.
- **Catastrophic** challenges involve the acquisition, possession, and use of WMD or methods producing WMD-like effects.
- **Disruptive** challenges may come from adversaries who develop and use break-through technologies to negate current U.S. advantages in key operational domains.

These categories overlap. Actors proficient in one can be expected to try to reinforce their position with methods and capabilities drawn from others.

Indeed, recent experience indicates that the most dangerous circumstances arise when we face a complex of challenges. For example, our adversaries in Iraq and Afghanistan presented both *traditional* and *irregular* challenges. Terrorist groups like al Qaeda are *irregular* threats but also actively seek

*catastrophic* capabilities. North Korea at once poses *traditional, irregular, and catastrophic* challenges. Finally, in the future, the most capable opponents may seek to combine truly *disruptive* capacity with *traditional, irregular, or catastrophic* forms of warfare.

**Traditional challenges** *Traditional* challenges are most often associated with states employing armies, navies, and air forces in well-recognized forms of military competition. *Traditional* military challenges remain important, as many states maintain capabilities to influence security conditions in their region. However, allied superiority in traditional domains, coupled with the costs of traditional military competition, drastically reduce adversaries’ incentives to compete with us in this arena.

As formidable as U.S. capabilities are against *traditional* opponents, we cannot ignore the challenges that such adversaries might present. Traditional challenges require us to maintain sufficient combat capability in key areas of military competition.

**Irregular Challenges.** Increasingly sophisticated *irregular* methods—e.g., terrorism and insurgency—challenge U.S. security interests. Adversaries employing irregular methods aim to erode U.S. influence, patience, and political will. Irregular opponents often take a long-term view so they attempt to impose prohibitive human, material, financial, and political costs on the U.S. to compel strategic retreat from a key region or course of action.

Two factors have intensified the danger of *irregular* challenges: the rise of extremist ideologies and the absence of effective governance.

Political, religious, and ethnic extremism continues to fuel conflicts worldwide.

The absence of effective governance in many parts of the world creates sanctuaries for terrorists, criminals, and insurgents. Many





states are unable, and in some cases unwilling, to exercise effective control over their territory or frontiers, thus leaving areas open to hostile exploitation.

Our experience in the war on terrorism points to the need to reorient our military capabilities to contend with such irregular challenges more effectively.

**Catastrophic Challenges.** In the face of American dominance in *traditional* forms of warfare, some hostile forces are seeking to acquire *catastrophic* capabilities, particularly weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Porous international borders, weak international controls, and as easy access to information-related technologies facilitate these efforts. Particularly troublesome is the nexus of transnational terrorists, proliferation, and problem states that possess or seek WMD, which increases the risk of WMD attack against the United States.

Proliferation of WMD technology and expertise makes contending with *catastrophic* challenges an urgent priority. Even a single *catastrophic* attack against the United States or an ally would be unacceptable, threaten the nation, institutions and free society. We will place greater emphasis on those capabilities that enable us to dissuade acquisition of catastrophic capabilities, deter their use, and when necessary defeat them before they can be employed.

**Disruptive Challenges.** In rare instances, revolutionary technological developments and associated military innovation can fundamentally alter long-established concepts of warfare. Some potential adversaries are seeking *disruptive* capabilities and may attempt to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities with such revolutionary breakthroughs. In doing so, they seek to offset the current advantages of the U.S. and its partners.

While most *disruptive* breakthroughs would confer only temporary advantage, some, including advances in biotechnology, cyber-

operations, space, or directed-energy weapons, could seriously endanger our security.

As such breakthroughs can be unpredictable; we should recognize their potential consequences and hedge against them.

## 2. Changing Relationships

Alongside the four security challenges are far-reaching changes in the international system:

- We continually adapt our defense partnerships.
- Key states face important decisions that will affect their strategic position.
- Some problem states will continue to pose challenges, while others could realize that their current policies undermine their own security.
- Hostile, non-state actors have substantial numbers, capability and influence.

### **Critical International Partnerships.**

International partnerships continue to be a principal source of our strength. Shared principles, a common view of threats and commitment to cooperation provide far greater security than we could achieve on our own. Unprecedented cooperation in the war on terrorism is an example of the benefits of strong international partnerships.

Our key partnerships must be adaptable. Today the United States and its partners are threatened less by *traditional* challenges and more by those who employ *catastrophic*, *irregular*, and *disruptive* capabilities and methods. Key U.S. relationships in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere are adapting and broadening in response to these changes. We have significantly expanded our circle of security partners around the world.





**Key States.** Several key states face basic decisions about their roles in global and regional politics, economics, and security, and the pace and direction of their own internal evolution. These decisions may change their strategic position in the world and their relationship with the United States. This uncertainty presents both opportunities and potential challenges for the United States. Some states may move toward greater cooperation with the U.S., while others could evolve into capable regional rivals or enemies.

Over time, some rising powers could pose significant *traditional* or *disruptive* challenges. They may be able to threaten the United States and our partners directly, rival us in key areas of military and technological competition, or threaten U.S. interests by pursuing dominance over key regions. In other cases, if adverse economic, political, and demographic trends continue, large capable states could become dangerously unstable and increasingly ungovernable, creating significant future *irregular* and potentially *catastrophic* challenges.

We remain alert to the possibility of renewed great power competition, recent developments in our relations with states like Russia, China, and India should encourage a degree of hope. As the President's *National Security Strategy* states, "Today, the international community has the best chance since the rise of the nation-state in the seventeenth century to build a world where great powers compete in peace instead of continually prepare for war."

**Problem States.** Problem states will continue to undermine regional stability and threaten U.S. interests. These states are hostile to U.S. principles. They commonly squander their resources to benefit ruling elites, their armed forces, or extremist clients. They often disregard international law and violate international agreements. Problem states may seek WMD or other destabilizing

military capabilities. Some sponsor terrorist activities, including by giving terrorists safe haven.

As recently demonstrated by Libya, however, some problem states may recognize that the pursuit of WMD leaves them less, not more, secure.

**Significant Non-State Actors.** Countering the military capabilities of state competitors alone cannot guarantee U.S. security. Challenges today emanate from a variety of state and non-state sources. The latter comprise a diverse collection of terrorists, insurgents, paramilitaries, and criminals who seek to undermine the legitimate governance of some states and who pose *irregular* and *catastrophic* challenges to the United States and its interests.

### 3. ASSUMPTIONS FRAMING THE STRATEGY

This strategy is built on key assumptions about the world, the nature of U.S. strengths and vulnerabilities, and the opportunities and challenges we are likely to see in the coming decade.

#### OUR STRENGTHS.

The United States will continue to enjoy a number of advantages:

- We will retain a resilient network of alliances and partnerships.
- We will have no global peer competitor and will remain unmatched in *traditional* military capability.
- We will maintain important advantages in other elements of national power—e.g., political, economic, technological, and cultural.
- We will continue to lead on issues of common international concern and will retain influence worldwide.



- We will enjoy political stability and economic prosperity at home.

### OUR VULNERABILITIES.

Nevertheless, we have vulnerabilities:

- Our influence and credibility will be affected by developments in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- Global security challenges will exceed our capacity to address them effectively alone.
- Our predominant position in world affairs will continue to breed unease, a degree of resentment, and resistance.
- We and our allies will be the principal targets of extremism and terrorism.
- Natural forces of inertia and resistance to change will constrain military transformation.

### OUR OPPORTUNITIES.

The future also offers opportunities:

- The end of the Cold War and our capacity to influence global events open the prospect for a new and peaceful international system.
- Problem states themselves will increasingly be vulnerable to the forces of positive political and economic change.
- Many of our key partners welcome a deepening of our security relationships.
- New international partners are seeking integration into our system of alliances and partnerships.

### OUR CHALLENGES.

In the framework of the four mature and emerging challenges outlined earlier, we will contend with the following particular challenges:

- Though we have no global peer, we will have competitors and enemies—state and non-state.
- Key international actors—states and international organizations—may choose strategic paths contrary to the interests of the United States.

- Adverse political change may occur in some currently friendly states.

- Crises related to political stability and governance will pose significant security challenges. Some of these may threaten fundamental interests of the United States, requiring a military response.

- Internationally—even among our closest partners—threats will be perceived differently, and consensus may be difficult to achieve.

### In summary:

These new security challenges, changing international relationships, and key strategic assumptions indicate that the coming decade will be a period of uncertainty and probable instability. These circumstances compel us to prepare for an *active defense* of the nation and its interests.



## 11. A DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR THE 21<sup>st</sup> CENTURY

This *National Defense Strategy* supports broader U.S. efforts to create conditions conducive to a secure international system—as the President’s National Security Strategy puts it, a balance of power that favors freedom. Such conditions include the effective and responsible exercise of sovereignty, representative governance, peaceful resolution of regional disputes, and open and competitive markets.

Our strategic circumstances are far different today from those of the Cold War.

Today, we enjoy significant advantages vis-à-vis prospective competitors, including an unprecedented capacity for constructive international leadership.

However, as described in Section I, we remain vulnerable to security challenges. We have learned that an unrivaled capacity to respond to *traditional* challenges is no longer sufficient. The consequences of even a single *catastrophic* attack, for example, are unthinkable. Therefore, we must confront challenges earlier and more comprehensively, before they are allowed to mature.

We seek to preclude the emergence of the gravest dangers by various means. The Defense Department’s capabilities are only one component of a comprehensive national and international effort. For example, battlefield success is only one element of our long-term, multi-faceted campaign against terrorism. Our activities range from training and humanitarian efforts to major combat operations.

### A. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

**1. Secure the United States from direct attack.** The September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks brought this nation to war. Our enemy is a complex network of *irregular*, ideologically-driven extremist actors. They seek to employ

various means, including *catastrophic* means, to terrorize our populations, undermine our partnerships, and erode our global influence. Their capacity for *catastrophic* violence dictates a new strategic imperative: we will actively confront—when possible, early and at safe distance—those who directly threaten us, employing all instruments of our national power.

*We will give top priority to those who seek to harm the United States directly*

**2. Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action.** The United States cannot influence that which it cannot reach. Securing strategic access to key regions, lines of communication, and the global commons:

- promotes the security and prosperity of the United States;
- ensures freedom of action;
- helps secure our partners; and
- helps protect the integrity of the international economic system.

*We will promote the security, prosperity and freedom of action of the United States and its partners by securing access to key regions, lines of communication and the global commons.*

### 3. Strengthen alliances and partnerships

A secure international system requires collective action. The U.S. has an interest in broad and capable partnerships with like-minded states. Therefore, we are strengthening security relationships with traditional allies and friends, developing new international partnerships and working to increase the capabilities of our partners to contend with common challenges.

*We will expand the community of like-minded nations and help partners increase their capacity to defend themselves and collectively meet challenges to our common interests.*

### 4. Establish favorable security conditions.

The United States will counter aggression or



coercion targeted at our partners and interests. Further, where dangerous political instability, aggression, or extremism threatens fundamental security interests, the U.S. will act with others to strengthen peace.

*We will create conditions conducive to a favorable international system by honoring our security commitments and working with others to bring about a common appreciation of threats; a broad, secure, and lasting peace; and the steps required to protect against these threats.*

## **B. HOW WE ACCOMPLISH OUR OBJECTIVES**

**1. Assure allies and friends.** Throughout the Cold War, our military presence and activities abroad upheld our commitment to our international partners. We shared risks by contributing to their physical defense. Now, given new challenges, we aim to assure a growing and more diverse community of partners of that same commitment.

*We will provide assurance by demonstrating our resolve to fulfill our defense commitments and help protect common interests.*

**2. Dissuade potential adversaries.** Would-be opponents will seek to offset our advantages. In response, we seek to limit their strategic options and dissuade them from adopting threatening capabilities, methods, or ambitions. We do this by strengthening our partnerships and visibly strengthening our leadership in key areas.

*We will work to dissuade potential adversaries from adopting threatening capabilities, methods, and ambitions, particularly by sustaining and developing our own key military advantages.*



## **3. Deter aggression and counter coercion.**

We remain committed to the active deterrence of aggression and coercion. Deterrence continues to rest on a recognized capacity and will to defeat adversaries' attacks, deny their objectives, and dominate at any level of potential escalation. However, as the character and composition of our principal challengers change, so too must our approaches to deterrence.

Ultimately, deterrence must hold at risk that which an opponent values most. For example, terrorists and insurgents, fueled by extremist ideologies and prone to *irregular* and *catastrophic* violence, are less subject to traditional approaches to deterrence.

Therefore, in addition to the threat of imposing unacceptable costs in response to adversaries' attacks, we also must have the capacity to deny an opponent 1) the ability to threaten us, and 2) the value of any such threats.

*We will deter by maintaining capable and rapidly deployable military forces and, when necessary, demonstrating both the resolve to use them and the determination to effect a decisive outcome on favorable terms.*

**A Defeat adversaries.** When deterrence fails or efforts short of military action do not forestall gathering threats, the United States will employ military power as necessary to defeat adversaries. In doing so, we will act with others when we can.

In all cases, we would seek to seize the initiative and dictate the tempo, timing, and direction of military operations. Bringing military operations to a favorable conclusion demands the integration of military and non-military actions. When combined, these measures should limit adversaries' options, deny them their means of support, defeat organized resistance, and establish security conditions conducive to a secure peace.

This strategy is intended to provide the President a broad range of options. These

include preventive actions to deny an opponent the strategic initiative or preempt a devastating attack; combat operations against a capable and organized military, paramilitary or insurgent adversary; and stability operations that could range from peace-keeping to substantial combat action.

Today's war on terrorism demonstrates that victory on conventional battlefields alone will not suffice. To win the Global War on Terrorism, the U.S. will lead a broad international effort to deny terrorist networks what they require to operate and survive. The U.S. will target eight major terrorist vulnerabilities:

- Ideological support – key to recruitment and indoctrination;
- Leadership;
- Foot soldiers – maintaining a regular flow of recruits;
- Safe havens – ability to train, plan, and operate without disruption;
- Weapons – including WMD;
- Funds;
- Communications and movement – including access to information and intelligence; ability to travel and attend meetings; and command and control; and
- Access to targets – the ability to plan and reach targets in the U.S. or abroad.

The strategy the U.S. is pursuing consists of three elements:

**Protecting the American homeland.** We contribute to protecting the homeland by sustaining the offensive against terrorist organizations by:

- Conducting military missions overseas;
- Sharing intelligence;
- Conducting air and maritime defense operations;
- Providing defense support to civil authorities as directed; and

Ensuring continuity of government.

**Disrupting and attacking terrorist networks.** The Department disrupts and destroys terrorist networks by:

- Setting the conditions to identify, disrupt, and defeat such networks, specifically the Al-Qaeda terrorist network;
- Preventing the exploitation by terrorist organizations of large, ungoverned spaces and border areas; and
- Improving the counterterrorism capabilities of allies and partners;

**Countering ideological support for terrorism.** The United States will support a multinational campaign to counter ideological support for terrorism. This campaign will be a decades-long struggle, one that brings together all instruments of national power to:

- Delegitimize terrorism and extremists by, e.g., eliminating state and private support for extremism.
- Make it politically unsustainable for any country to support or condone terrorism; and
- Support models of moderation in the Muslim world by:
  - Building stronger security ties with moderate Muslim countries;
  - Helping change Muslim misperceptions of the United States and the West; and
  - Reinforcing the message that the Global War on Terrorism is not a war against Islam, but rather encompasses a civil war within Islam between extremists and moderates.

Countering the ideological appeal of the terrorist network of networks is key to stemming the flow of recruits into the ranks of terrorist organizations. As in the Cold War, victory will come only when the ideological motivation for the terrorists' activities has been discredited, and no longer has the power to motivate streams of individuals to risk and sacrifice their lives.





*At the direction **&** the President, we will defeat adversaries at the time, place, and in the manner **&** our choosing – setting the conditions for future security.*

### C. IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES

These are guidelines for the Department's strategic planning and decision-making:

**1. Active, Layered Defense.** The U.S. will seize the strategic initiative in all areas of defense activity — assuring, dissuading, deterring, and defeating. Our first priority is the defeat of direct threats to the United States. Terrorists have demonstrated that they can conduct devastating surprise attacks. Allowing opponents to strike first—particularly in an era of proliferation and *catastrophic* terrorism—is unacceptable. Therefore, the United States must defeat the most dangerous challenges early and at a safe distance, before they are allowed to mature.

Prevention is thus a critical component of an active, layered defense. We will aim to prevent destabilizing conflict. If conflict becomes unavoidable, we will strive to bring about lasting change to check the emergence of like challenges in the future.

Preventive actions include security cooperation, forward deterrence, humanitarian assistance, peace operations, and non-proliferation initiatives—including international cooperation to interdict illicit WMD transiting the commons. Preventive actions also might entail other military operations—for example, to prevent the outbreak of hostilities or to help defend or restore a friendly government. Under the most dangerous and compelling circumstances, prevention might require the use of force to disable or destroy WMD in the possession of terrorists or others or to strike targets (e.g. terrorists) that directly threaten the United States.

The U.S. cannot achieve its defense objectives alone. Our concept of active, layered defense must include international partners. Thus, among the key goals of the *National Security Strategy* is to work with other nations to resolve regional crises and conflicts. In some cases, U.S. forces will play a supporting role, lending assistance to others when our unique capabilities are needed. In other cases, U.S. forces will be supported by international partners.

Another layer in an active, layered approach is the immediate physical defense of the United States. At the direction of the President or the Secretary of Defense, the Department will undertake military missions at home to defend the United States, its population, and its critical infrastructure from external attack. In emergencies, we will act quickly to provide unique capabilities to other federal agencies when the need surpasses the capacities of civilian responders and we are directed to do so by the President or the Secretary. Under some circumstances, the Department will provide support to outside agencies for one-time events of limited scope and duration.

*We will focus our military planning, posture, operations, and capabilities on the active, forward, and layered defense **&** our nation, our interests, and our partners.*

**2. Continuous Transformation.** Continuous defense transformation is part of a wider governmental effort to transform America's national security institutions to meet 21<sup>st</sup> - century challenges and opportunities. Just as our challenges change continuously, so too must our military capabilities.

The purpose of transformation is to extend key advantages and reduce vulnerabilities. We are now in a long-term struggle against persistent, adaptive adversaries, and must transform to prevail.

Transformation is not only about technology. It is also about:



- changing the way we think about challenges and opportunities;
- adapting the defense establishment to that new perspective; and,
- refocusing capabilities to meet future challenges, not those we are already most prepared to meet.

Transformation requires difficult choices. Therefore, we will need to divest in some areas and invest in others.

Transformational change is not limited to operational forces. We also want to change long-standing business processes within the Department to take advantage of information technology. And, we are working to transform our international partnerships, including the capabilities that we and our partners can use collectively.

We want to foster a culture of innovation. The war on terrorism imparts an urgency to defense transformation: we must transform to win the war.

*We will continually adapt how we approach and confront challenges, conduct business, and work with others.*

### 3. **Capabilities-Based Approach.**

Capabilities-based planning focuses more on how adversaries may challenge us than on who those adversaries might be or where we might face them. It focuses the Department on the growing range of capabilities and methods we must possess to contend with an uncertain future. It recognizes the limits of intelligence and the impossibility of predicting complex events with precision. Our planning aims to link capabilities to joint operating concepts across a broad range of scenarios.

The Department is adopting a new approach for planning to implement our strategy. The defense strategy will drive this top-down, competitive process. Operating within fiscal constraints, our new approach enables the

Secretary of Defense and Joint Force Commanders to balance risk across traditional, irregular, disruptive and catastrophic challenges.

*We will strengthen our opportunity-oriented approach for addressing mature and emerging challenges — setting priorities among competing capabilities.*

**4. Managing Risks.** Effectively managing defense risks is central to executing the *National Defense Strategy*. The Department takes a comprehensive, strategic approach to enable the Secretary of Defense to adjust priorities prudently.

The 2001 QDR is the Department's vehicle for risk assessment. It identifies the key dimensions of risk and enables the Secretary to evaluate the size, shape, posture, commitment, and management of our armed forces relative to the objectives of the *National Defense Strategy*. It allows the Secretary of Defense to assess the tradeoffs between objectives and resource constraints. The risk framework comprises: *operational risk, future challenges risk, force management risk, and institutional risk*

- ***Operational*** risks are those associated with the current force executing the strategy successfully within acceptable human, material, financial, and strategic costs.
- ***Future challenges*** risks are those associated with the Department's capacity to execute future missions successfully against an array of prospective future challengers.
- ***Force management*** risks are those associated with managing military forces fulfilling the missions described in this *National Defense Strategy*. The primary concern here is recruiting, retaining, training, and equipping a ready force and sustaining that readiness.





- ***Institutional*** risks are those associated with the capacity of new command, management, and business practices.

We assess the likelihood of a variety of problems—most notably, failure or prohibitive costs in pursuit of strategic, operational, or management objectives. This approach recognizes that some objectives, though desirable, may not be attainable, while others, though attainable, may not be worth the costs.

Choices in one area affect choices in others. The Department will make deliberate choices within and across each broad category **and** will maintain a balance among them—driven by this Defense Strategy.

*We will consider the full range of risks associated with resources and operations and manage explicit tradeoffs across the Department.*



## 111. DESIRED CAPABILITIES AND ATTRIBUTES

Our strategy requires high-quality joint force. We remain committed to increasing levels of joint competency and capability.

Our goal is not dominance in all areas of military capability, but the means to reduce vulnerabilities while fortifying warfighting advantages. We will:

- develop and sustain key operational capabilities;
- shape and size forces to meet near- and mid-term needs; and,
- strengthen our global defense posture to contend with our new strategic circumstances.

### A. KEY OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES

Eight operational capabilities are the focus for defense transformation:

**1. Strengthening intelligence.** Intelligence directly supports strategy, planning, and decision-making; it facilitates improvements in operational capabilities; and it informs programming and risk management. Three areas, in particular, are priorities:

- **Early Warning.** First priority is improving our capacity for early warning. Decision-makers, for example, require adequate warning of imminent crises—e.g., unexpected instability or *catastrophic* threat. They also need information enabling them to anticipate and assess rising *irregular* and *disruptive* challenges.

- **Deliver Exacting Intelligence.** We will improve support to intelligence consumers through transformation in both organization and process. Specifically, we aim to increase our capabilities for collection; shift to a more consumer-friendly approach; and better

anticipate adversary behavior through competitive analysis.

- **Horizontal Integration.** The intelligence community can play a central role in developing joint solutions. To the extent possible, we seek to fuse operations and intelligence and break down the institutional, technological, and cultural barriers that separate them. This will enable us better to acquire, assess, and deliver critical intelligence both to senior decision-makers and to warfighters.

*We will strengthen our intelligence capabilities and integrate them into operations to inform decision-making and resource planning.*

### 2. Protecting critical bases of operation.

Our premier base of operation is the United States itself. Secure bases of operation make possible our political and military freedom of action, reassure the nation and its partners, and enable the timely generation and deployment of military forces worldwide. Securing critical bases requires actionable intelligence, strategic warning, and the ability to defeat direct threats—if possible before they are able to mature.

A range of *traditional*, *catastrophic*, *irregular*, and perhaps *disruptive* methods and capabilities threaten bases of operation at home and abroad. While we can identify some—e.g., missiles and WMD—others, like those employed against the U.S. and its partners since 9/11, may be harder to identify. We need to improve defenses against such challenges and increase our capacity to defeat them at a distance.

*We will protect critical bases of operation, including, most importantly, the U.S. homeland, against both mature and emerging challenges.*

### 3. Operating from the global commons.

Our ability to operate in and from the global



commons – space, international waters and airspace, and cyberspace – is critical. It enables us to project power anywhere in the world from secure bases of operation. Our capacity to operate in and from the strategic commons is critical to the direct defense of the U.S. and its partners and provides a stabilizing influence in key regions.

It provides our forces operational freedom of action. Ceding our historic maritime advantage would unacceptably limit our global reach. Our capacity to operate from international airspace and outer space will remain critically important for joint operations. In particular, as the nation's reliance on space-based systems continues to grow, we must guard against new vulnerabilities. Key goals, therefore, are to ensure our access to and use of space, and to deny hostile exploitation of space to adversaries.

Cyberspace is a new theater of operations. Consequently, information operations (IO) has become a core military competency. Successful military operations depend on the ability to protect information infrastructure and data. Increased dependence on information networks creates new vulnerabilities that adversaries may seek to exploit. At the same time, an adversary's use of information networks and technologies creates opportunities for us to conduct discriminate offensive IO as well. Developing IO as a core military competency requires fundamental shifts in processes, policies, and culture.

*We will operate in and from the commons by overcoming challenges to our global maritime, air, space, and cyberspace operations.*

**4. Projecting and sustaining forces in distant anti-access environments.** Our role in the world depends on our effectively projecting and sustaining forces in distant environments where adversaries may seek to

deny us access. Our capacity to project power depends first on the security of our bases and on our access to the strategic commons. Thus, the U.S. must overcome a range of challenges to our access.

Prospective *traditional* adversaries could employ advanced and legacy military capabilities and methods to deny us access. Ultimately, they may combine their most advanced *traditional* capabilities with future *disruptive* technologies to threaten our capacity to project power.

Other opponents may employ less sophisticated, but potentially no less effective, means either to deny access to us or intimidate others to do so. Their options are numerous, including the innovative employment of legacy capabilities and indirect threats posed by *traditional* or *irregular* attacks intended to impose unacceptable costs on friendly governments.

*We will project and sustain our forces in distant anti-access environments in the face of a broad range of mature and emerging challenges.*

**5. Denying enemies sanctuary.** Adversaries who threaten the U.S. and its interests require secure bases from which to do so. They will use great distance or the sanctuary created by ungoverned territory to their advantage. The more we hold adversaries' critical bases of operation at risk, the more likely we are to limit their strategic options.

A key goal is developing the capability to surge appropriate military forces rapidly from strategic distances to deny adversaries' sanctuary wherever they might seek it. In some cases, this will involve discrete SOF or precision attacks on targets deep inside enemy territory. In others, sustained joint combat operations will be in order, requiring the comprehensive defeat of significant *irregular* or *traditional* opponents operating in and from enemy territory or an ungoverned area.



A robust capacity to deny sanctuary requires a number of capabilities including: persistent surveillance and precision strike; operational maneuver from strategic distances; sustained joint combat operations in and from austere locations, at significant operational depths; and stability operations to assist in the restoration of effective and responsible control over ungoverned territory.

*We will deny our enemies sanctuary by conducting effective military activities and operations in and from austere geographic locations and at varying operational depths.*

#### 6. Conducting network-centric operations.

The foundation of network-centric operations proceeds from a simple proposition: the whole of an integrated and networked force is far more capable than the sum of its parts. Continuing advances in information and communications technologies hold promise for networking highly distributed joint and combined forces. Network-centric operational capability is achieved by linking compatible information systems with usable data to generate greater efficiency and effectiveness in military operations. The functions of sensing, decision-making, and acting—which often in the past were built into a single platform—can now work closely even if they are geographically distributed across the battlespace.

Bringing decisive capabilities to bear will increasingly rely on our capacity to harness, exploit, and protect advantages in the realm of information. Networking our forces will provide the foundation for doing so. Operations in the war on terrorism have demonstrated the advantages of timely, accurate, and relevant information, while at the same time reinforcing the need for even greater joint, interoperable C4ISR.

Beyond battlefield applications, a network-centric force holds great potential for increasing efficiency and effectiveness across defense operations, intelligence functions,

and business processes by giving all users access to the latest, most relevant, most accurate information. It also enables reach-back by more effectively employing people and capabilities without deploying them forward.

Transforming to a network-centric force requires fundamental shifts in processes, policy, and culture. Change in these areas will provide the necessary speed, accuracy and quality of decision-making critical to future success.

*We will conduct network-centric operations with compatible information and communications systems, usable data, and flexible operational constructs.*

#### 7. Improving proficiency against irregular challenges.

*Irregular* conflict will be our most persistent challenge for the foreseeable future. It will transcend theaters and contingencies, placing unique demands on the nation and its armed forces. Irregular challenges will involve our forces in complex security problems for some time to come, redefining past conceptions of “general-purpose forces.”

Comprehensive defeat of *irregular* opponents will require sustained operations and significant time. Indeed, strategic success may require extended stability operations that include substantial combat action, counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, and reconstruction. To contend with persistent irregular challenges we require forces that can:

- identify and characterize irregular challengers;
- quickly foreclose their options;
- deny their strategic and operational objectives;
- comprehensively defeat their forces and capabilities; and,



- establish and maintain favorable long-term security conditions.

Posturing for success against irregular adversaries necessitates more modular, adaptable, and broadly employable joint forces. It will demand changes in capabilities, organizations, doctrine, concepts, and culture. More broadly, achieving enduring results against irregular threats will require integration of national and international capabilities spanning the traditional elements of power.

*We will improve our ability to contend with irregular challenges by developing more modular, adaptable, and broadly employable forces.*

**8. Increasing capabilities of partners—international and domestic.** Our strategic objectives are not attainable without the support and assistance of capable partners at home and abroad.

Abroad, the United States is transforming its security relationships and developing new partnerships to confront the challenges of a new century. We are reorienting our own capabilities to support changing relationships, and we are seeking to improve those of our partners to make them both more capable and interoperable.

One of the principal vehicles for strengthening alliances and partnerships is our security cooperation program. It assists in strengthening key relationships by:

- identifying areas where our common interests would be served better by partners playing leading roles;
- encouraging partners to improve their capability to operate in coalition with our forces, as well as their willingness to do so;

- reducing impediments to cooperation with partner militaries and ministries of defense; and,

- spurring the military transformation of key allies through joint, combined training and education; combined concept development and experimentation; information sharing; and combined command and control.

Security cooperation also is critical to expanding international capacity to meet common security challenges. For example, at the President's behest, this Department, in cooperation with other U.S. agencies and foreign governments, is committed to increasing international capacity for peace operations worldwide.

At home, we seek to increase the capabilities of our domestic partners—local, state, and federal—to improve homeland defense. This Department seeks effective partnerships with domestic agencies that are charged with security and consequence management in the event of significant *irregular* or *catastrophic* attacks against the homeland. In doing so, we seek to improve their ability to respond effectively, while focusing the unique capabilities of this Department on the early defeat of these challenges abroad.

Navigating today's turbulent world requires new competencies and expanded capacities across the U.S. government and the international community. Thus, we seek to bolster the capabilities of U.S. civilian agencies and international partners to contribute to the resolution of complex crises overseas. In particular, the Department seeks to increase the capacity of interagency and international partners to undertake non-military stabilization and reconstruction tasks that often become military responsibilities by default. Our intent is not to shirk our responsibilities in stability operations, but to focus our efforts on those tasks most directly associated with establishing favorable long-term security conditions.





*We will help international and domestic partners increase their Capabilities to contend with complex issues of common concern.*

## B. ATTRIBUTES

To execute this strategy, U.S. military forces must possess a number of critical attributes:

### 1. Shape and Size of Military Forces

The shape, size, and global posture of U.S. military forces are configured to:

- defend the U.S. homeland;<sup>1</sup>
- operate in and from four forward regions to assure allies and friends, dissuade competitors, and deter and counter aggression and coercion;
- swiftly defeat adversaries in overlapping military campaigns while preserving for the President the option to call for a more decisive and enduring result in a single operation; and,<sup>2</sup>
- Conduct a limited number of lesser contingencies.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Homeland Defense activities represent the employment of unique military capabilities at home—at varying levels—to contend with those circumstances described at the conclusion of Section II, C., 1.

<sup>2</sup> Campaigns to “swiftly defeat” the efforts of adversaries are undertaken to achieve a circumscribed set of objectives aimed at altering an adversary’s behavior or policies, swiftly denying an adversary’s operational or strategic objectives, preventing attacks or uncontrolled conflict escalation, and/or rapidly re-establishing security conditions favorable to the United States and its partners. “Swiftly defeating” adversary efforts could include a range of military activities—from stability operations to major combat that will vary substantially in size and duration. Examples of “swift defeat” campaigns include *Operation(s) Desert Storm* and *Allied Force*.

Campaigns to “win decisively” are undertaken to bring about fundamental, favorable change in a crisis region and create enduring results. They may entail lengthy periods of both major combat and stability operations; require regime change, defense, or restoration; and entail significant investments of the nation’s resources and time. “Win decisive” campaigns will vary significantly in size and scope but will be among the most taxing scenarios. Examples of “win decisive” campaigns include *Operation(s) Just Cause* and *Iraqi Freedom*.

<sup>3</sup> Lesser Contingency Operations are undertaken to resolve or ameliorate particular crisis circumstances and typically describe operations more limited in duration and scope than those outlined above. These operations include military activities like shows of force, strikes and raids, non-combatant evacuation operations, peace operations, and disaster relief or humanitarian assistance. Lesser

These force planning precepts inform decisions on the force’s overall mix of capabilities, size, posture, patterns of activity, readiness, and capacity to surge globally.

The force planning framework does not focus on specific conflicts. Instead, it is a model for determining capabilities required for a range of scenarios. Rigorous analysis determines the force requirements for the most likely, the most dangerous, and the most demanding circumstances. Assessments of U.S. capabilities will examine the breadth and depth of this construct, not seek to optimize in a single area. Doing so will allow decision-makers to identify areas where we might accept prudent risk and areas where risk should be reduced or mitigated. Importantly, operations for the war on terrorism span the breadth of this construct.

**Defend the homeland.** Our most important contribution to the security of the U.S. homeland is our capacity to disrupt and defeat threats early and at a safe distance, as far from the U.S. and its partners as possible. Our ability to identify and defeat threats abroad—before they can strike—while making critical contributions to the direct defense of our territory and population is the *sine qua non* of our nation’s security.

**Operate in and from four forward regions.** Our military presence abroad will be comprised of tailored and increasingly rotational forces operating in and from four forward regions—Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian Littoral, and the Middle East-Southwest Asia. Complemented by our capabilities for prompt global action, our forces overseas help assure partners, dissuade military competition, and deter aggression and coercion.

contingency operations range in size from major undertakings like *Operation(s) Restore Hope* or *Provide Comfort* to the much smaller, episodic dispatch of U.S. forces to respond to emergency conditions.

Our forward deterrence capabilities, in particular, are adaptable forces able to respond rapidly to emerging crises and control escalation on our terms. These forces are complemented by immediately employable global strike, special operations, and information operations capabilities that provide additional options for preventing and deterring attacks.

Our military presence in the four regions does not constrain our capacity to undertake military missions worldwide, nor does it delimit our global interests. For example, we remain steadfast in our commitment to the security of the Americas, yet we require a very small military presence in Central and South America. Our current military presence abroad recognizes that significant U.S. interests and the bulk of our forward military presence are concentrated in the four regions, even as our forces are positioned to undertake military operations worldwide.

**Swiftly defeat adversaries and achieve decisive, enduring results.** We rarely will be certain about the location and specific dimensions of future conflicts. Therefore, we maintain a total force that is properly balanced and postured for rapid deployment and employment worldwide. We must be capable of surging forces into two widely dispersed theaters to “swiftly defeat” adversaries in overlapping military campaigns.

Further, recent experience reinforces the need for a robust force capable of turning one of two “swift defeat” campaigns, if the President so decides, into an operation seeking more far-reaching objectives. Accomplishing these goals requires agile joint forces capable of rapidly foreclosing an adversary’s options, achieving decisive results in major combat actions, and setting the security conditions for enduring conflict resolution. We must plan for the latter to include extended stability operations involving substantial combat and requiring

the rapid application of national and international capabilities spanning the elements of state power.

**Conduct lesser contingencies.** Our global interests will require our armed forces to undertake a limited number of lesser contingency operations, perhaps for extended periods of time. Lesser contingencies include smaller-scale combat operations such as strikes and raids; peace operations; humanitarian missions; and non-combatant evacuations. Because these contingencies place burdens on the same types of forces needed for more demanding military campaigns, the Department closely monitors the degree and nature of involvement in lesser contingencies to properly balance force management and operational risks.

## **2. Global Defense Posture**

To better meet new strategic circumstances, we are transforming our network of alliances and partnerships, our military capabilities, and our global defense posture. Our security is inextricably linked to that of our partners. The forward posture of U.S. forces and our demonstrated ability to bring forces to bear in a crisis are among the most tangible signals of our commitment to the security of our international partners.

Through the 1990s, U.S. forces remained concentrated in Cold War locations—primarily in Western Europe and Northeast Asia. While that posture was prudent for that environment, it is less so today. In the Cold War we positioned our forces to fight where they were stationed. Today, we no longer expect our forces to fight in place. Rather, operational experience since 1990 indicates we will surge forces from a global posture to respond to crises. This recognition, combined with rapid advances in technology, new concepts of operation, and operational lessons learned, is driving a comprehensive,





strategy-driven realignment of U.S. global defense posture.

The President recently stated, “A fully transformed and strengthened overseas force posture will underscore the commitment of the United States to effective collective action in the common cause of peace and liberty.” Force posture changes will strengthen our ability to meet our security commitments and contend with new challenges more effectively. As we transform our posture, we are guided by the following goals:

- expanding allied roles and building new security partnerships;
- developing greater flexibility to contend with uncertainty by emphasizing agility and by not overly concentrating military forces in a few locations;
- focusing within and across regions by complementing tailored regional military presence and activities with capabilities for prompt global military action;
- developing rapidly deployable capabilities by planning and operating from the premise that forces will not likely fight in place; and,
- focusing on capabilities, not numbers, by reinforcing the premise that the United States does not need specific numbers of platforms or personnel in administrative regions to be able to execute its security commitments effectively.

**Key changes to global defense posture.** Key changes in global defense posture lie in five interrelated areas: *relationships, activities, facilities, legal arrangements, and global sourcing and surge.*

**Relationships.** Our ability to cooperate with others in the world depends on having a harmony of views on the challenges that confront us and our strategy for meeting those challenges. Strengthening defense

relationships at all levels helps build such harmony.

Changes in global posture seek both to strengthen our relationships with partners around the world and to help cultivate new relationships founded on common security interests. We are transforming many of our alliances to contend with our new circumstances. Command structures are another important part of our relationships and are being tailored to address our new political and operational needs.

**Activities.** Our posture also includes the many military *activities* in which we engage around the world. This means not only our physical presence in key regions, but also our training, exercises, and operations. They involve small units working together in a wide range of capacities; major formations conducting elaborate exercises to achieve proficiency in joint and combined operations; and the “nuts and bolts” of providing support to ongoing operations. They also involve the force protection that we and our allies provide to each other. We also will lower the operational vulnerability of our forces and reduce local social and political friction with host populations.

**Facilities.** A network of forward *facilities* and capabilities, mainly in four critical regions, provides the United States with an unmatched ability to act globally. However, the increasing threat posed by *catastrophic* challenges and the likelihood of surprise place an even higher premium on rapid military action.

To strengthen our capability for prompt global action and our flexibility to employ military forces where needed, we require the capacity to move swiftly into and through strategic pivot points and remote locations. The new global posture, using main operating bases (MOB); forward operating sites (FOS); and a diverse array of more austere cooperative security locations (CSL), will



support such needs. In addition, our prepositioned equipment and stocks overseas will be better configured and positioned for global employment, while making better use of “reach-back” capabilities for those functions that can be accomplished without deploying forward.

MOBs are permanent bases with resident forces and robust infrastructure. They are intended to support training, security cooperation, and the deployment and employment of military forces for operations. The more austere facilities — FOSs and CSLs — are focal points for combined training and will expand and contract as needed to support military operations. FOSs are scalable facilities intended for rotational use by operational forces. They often house prepositioned equipment and a modest, permanent support presence. FOSs are able to support a range of military activities on short notice. CSLs are intended for contingency access, logistical support, and rotational use by operational forces. CSLs generally will have little or no permanent US personnel assigned. In addition to these, joint sea-basing too holds promise for the broader transformation of our overseas military posture.

Increasing the flexibility and support provided by prepositioned equipment and materiel is another important aspect of our facilities infrastructure. A decade of operational experience indicates that a new, more innovative approach to prepositioned equipment and stocks is needed. Support materiel and combat capabilities should be positioned in critical regions and along key transportation routes to enable worldwide deployment.

Prepositioned capabilities afloat are especially valuable in a strategic environment characterized by uncertainty. In addition, single-service prepositioned capabilities will no longer suffice. As in all other aspects of

transformation, prepositioning must be increasingly joint in character.

The new posture will be enabled by “reach-back” capabilities, support capabilities that are available remotely rather than in forward theaters. For example, intelligence support, including battle damage assessment, can be provided from outside the theater of operations. Leveraging reach-back capabilities reduces our footprint abroad and strengthens our military effectiveness. We also seek to increase the involvement of our partners in reach-back functions.

**Legal arrangements.** Many of the current legal arrangements that govern overseas posture date from an era characterized by very different security challenges. Today, challenges are more diverse and complex, our prospective contingencies are more widely dispersed, and our international partners are more numerous. International agreements relevant to our posture must reflect these circumstances and support greater operational flexibility. They must help, not hinder, the rapid deployment and employment of U.S. and coalition forces worldwide in a crisis.

While respectful of our partners’ sovereign concerns, we will seek new legal arrangements that maximize our freedom to:

- deploy our forces wherever they are needed;
- conduct essential training with partners in the host nation; and,
- support deployed forces around the world.

Finally, legal arrangements should encourage responsibility-sharing between us and our partners, as well as provide sufficient legal protections for our personnel.

**Global sourcing and surge.** Our military needs to be managed in a way that will allow us to deploy a greater percentage of our force



where and when it is needed, anywhere in the world. Thus, the Department is transitioning to a global force management process. This will allow us to *source* our force needs from a global, rather than regional, perspective and to *surge* capabilities when needed into crisis theaters from disparate locations worldwide. Our global presence will be managed dynamically, ensuring that our joint capabilities are employed to the greatest effect.

Under this concept, Combatant Commanders no longer “own” forces in their theaters. Forces are apportioned to them as needed—sourced from anywhere in the world. This allows for greater flexibility to meet rapidly changing operational circumstances.

A prominent consideration in our global posture changes is to move our most rapidly deployable capabilities forward. For example, heavy forces will return to the United States, to be replaced in large part by more expeditionary capabilities such as airborne forces and Stryker brigades. As a result, our immediate response times should be greatly improved.



# **National Military Strategy** **of the United States of America** **2004**



**A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow**

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## Table of Contents

Foreword .....	• • •
Executive Summary .....	iii
I. Introduction .....	1
A. Strategic Guidance .....	1
1. The National Security Strategy .....	1
2. The 2004 National Defense Strategy .....	1
B. The Role of the National Military Strategy .....	2
C. Key Aspects of the Security Environment .....	4
1. A Wider Range of Adversaries .....	4
2. A More Complex and Distributed Battlespace .....	5
3. Technology Diffusion and Access .....	6
D. Strategic Principles .....	6
1. Agility .....	6
2. Decisiveness .....	7
3. Integration .....	7
II. National Military Objectives .....	7
A. Protect the United States .....	8
B. Prevent Conflict and Surprise Attacks .....	10
C. Prevail Against Adversaries .....	12
III. A Joint Force for Mission Success .....	13
A. Desired Attributes .....	14
B. Functions and Capabilities .....	14
1. Applying Force .....	15
2. Deploying and Sustaining Military Capabilities .....	15
3. Securing Battlespace .....	16
4. Achieving Decision Superiority .....	17
IV. Force Design and Size .....	19
A. Force Design and Size .....	19
B. <b>Risk</b> and Force Assessments .....	20
V. Joint Vision for Future Warfighting .....	20
A. Full Spectrum Dominance .....	21
B. Initiatives .....	21
VI. Conclusion .....	24



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### Foreword


The “National Military Strategy” conveys my message to the Joint Force on the strategic direction the Armed Forces of the United States should follow to support the National Security and Defense Strategies in this time of war. This document describes the ways and means to **protect** the United States, **prevent** conflict and surprise attack and **prevail** against adversaries who threaten our homeland, deployed forces, allies and friends. Success rests on three priorities:

First, while protecting the United States we must **win the War on Terrorism**. The attacks of 11 September 2001 demonstrated that our liberties are vulnerable. The prospect of future attacks, potentially employing weapons of mass destruction, makes it imperative we act now to stop terrorists before they can attack again. We must continue to root out transnational terrorist networks, sever their connections with state sponsors, eliminate their bases of operation, counter dangerous proliferation and establish a global antiterrorism environment. This mission requires the full integration of **all** instruments of national power, the cooperation and participation of friends and allies and the support of the American people.

Second, we will **enhance our ability to fight as a joint force**. Joint teamwork is an integral part of our culture and focus as we develop leaders, organizations, systems and doctrine. We must continue to strengthen trust and confidence among the Service components that comprise the Joint Force. Enhancing joint warfighting requires the integration of our Active and Reserve Components and our civilian work force to create a seamless total force that can meet future challenges. We must strengthen collaboration among our joint forces, agencies at all levels of government and multinational partners. Key to such collaboration is an improved ability to collect, process and share information.

Third, we will **transform the Armed Forces** “in stride” - fielding new capabilities and adopting new operational concepts while actively taking the fight to terrorists. Transformation requires a combination of technology, intellect and cultural adjustments - adjustments that reward innovation and creativity. In-stride transformation **will** ensure US forces emerge from the struggle against terrorism with our joint force fully prepared to meet future global challenges.

The NMS serves to focus the Armed Forces on maintaining US leadership in a global community that is challenged on many fronts - from countering the threat of global terrorism to fostering emerging democracies. In this environment, US presence and commitment to partners are essential. Our Armed Forces, operating at home and abroad, in peace and war, will continue to serve as a constant, visible reminder of US resolve to protect common interests. Our dedication to security and stability ensures that the United States is viewed as an indispensable partner, encouraging other nations to join us in helping make the world not just safer, but better.



RICHARD B. MYERS

Chairman  
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff



## Executive Summary

### Chairman's Intent

Our challenge for the coming year and beyond is to stay the course in the War on Terrorism as we continue to transform our Armed Forces to conduct future joint operations. We cannot afford to let our recent successes cause us to lose focus or lull us *into* satisfaction with our current capabilities. The war is not over, and there is still dangerous work to do. To meet *this* challenge, we continue to focus on three priorities: winning the War on Terrorism, enhancing joint warfighting and transforming for the future.

### Strategic Guidance

The National Military Strategy is guided by the goals and objectives contained in the President's "National Security Strategy" and serves to implement the Secretary of Defense's 2004 "National Defense Strategy of the United States of America."

### The Role of the NMS

The NMS provides focus for military activities by defining a set of interrelated military objectives from which the Service Chiefs and combatant commanders identify desired capabilities and against which CJCS assesses risk.

### Key Aspects of the Security Environment

- A Wider Range of Adversaries
- A More Complex and Distributed Battlespace
- Technology Diffusion and Access

### Principles guiding the development of the Joint Force

- Agility
- Decisiveness
- Integration

### Military Objectives

The NMS establishes three military objectives that support the National Defense Strategy:

- Protect the United States Against External Attacks and Aggression
- Prevent Conflict and Surprise Attack
- Prevail Against Adversaries.

### Desired Attributes of the Force

- Fully Integrated
- Expeditionary
- Networked
- Decentralized
- Adaptable
- Decision Superiority
- Lethality

### Capabilities and Functions

- Applying Force
- Deploying and Sustaining Military Capabilities
- Securing Battlespace
- Achieving Decision Superiority

### Designing and Sizing the Force

Executing the NMS requires a force able to generate decisive effects in any contingency and sustain multiple, overlapping operations. The force must have the capabilities necessary to create and preserve an enduring peace.

### Joint Vision for Future Warfighting

Sustaining and increasing the qualitative military advantages the United States enjoys today **will** require transformation - a transformation achieved by combining technology, intellect and cultural changes across the joint community. The goal is Full Spectrum Dominance - the ability to control any situation or defeat any adversary across the range of military operations.



## I. Introduction

The National ~~Military~~ Strategy (NMS) supports the aims of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and implements the 2004 National Defense Strategy (NDS). It describes the Armed Forces' plan to achieve military objectives in the near term and provides the vision for ensuring they remain decisive in the future.

### A. Strategic Guidance

#### 1. *The National Security Strategy*

The President's NSS affirms the Nation's commitment to "help make the world not just safer but better." **This** requires victory in the War on Terrorism (WOT) – a victory that is enduring and contributes to defending, preserving and extending the peace. The NSS directs an active strategy to counter transnational terrorist networks, rogue nations and aggressive states that possess or are working to gain weapons of mass destruction or effect (WMD/E).<sup>1</sup> It emphasizes activities to foster relationships among US allies, partners and friends. **Such** relationships support efforts to strike globally at terrorist organizations and create conditions inhospitable to terrorism and rogue regimes. The NSS highlights the need to retain and improve capabilities to prevent attacks against the United States, work cooperatively **with** other nations and multinational organizations and transform America's national security institutions.

#### 2. *The 2004 National Defense Strategy*

The 2004 NDS supports the **NSS** by establishing a set of overarching defense objectives that guide the Department's security activities and provide direction for the National Military Strategy. The NDS objectives serve as **links** between military activities and those of other government agencies in pursuit of national goals. The Department must take action to secure the United States from direct attack and counter, at a safe distance, those who seek to harm the country. The Department must work to secure strategic access to key regions, lines of communication and the "global commons" of international waters, airspace, space and cyberspace. Defense activities must help establish security conditions favorable to the United States and its partners while working to expand the community of like-minded nations. The Department will also work to strengthen alliances and partnerships by helping other nations increase their ability to defend themselves and protect common security interests.

**Four** Defense objectives will guide DOD security activities:

- Secure the United States from direct attack.
- Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action.
- Establish security conditions conducive to a favorable international order.
- Strengthen alliances and partnerships to contend with common challenges.

*2004 National Defense Strategy*

<sup>1</sup> The term WMD/E relates to a broad range of adversary capabilities that pose potentially devastating impacts. WMD/E includes chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced high explosive weapons as well as other, more asymmetrical "weapons". They may rely more on disruptive impact than destructive kinetic effects. For example, cyber attacks on US commercial information systems or attacks against transportation networks may have a greater economic or psychological effect than a relatively small release of a lethal agent.



The NDS focuses Department activities on actions that assure allies and friends, dissuade potential adversaries, deter aggression and counter coercion and defeat adversaries. These interconnected activities promote close cooperation with those committed to the principles of freedom, democracy and opportunity. The 2004 NDS provides four guidelines for implementing the strategy – create an active defense-in-depth; conduct continuous transformation; adopt a capabilities-based approach; and manage risks. These guidelines will structure strategic planning and decision-making across **all** segments of the Department.

## **B. The Role of the National Military Strategy**

The NMS derives objectives, missions and capability requirements from an analysis of the NSS, the NDS and the security environment. The NSS and NDS provide a broad strategic context for employing military capabilities in concert with other instruments of national power. The NMS provides focus for military activities by defining a set of interrelated military objectives and joint operating concepts from which the Service Chiefs and combatant commanders identify desired capabilities and against which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assesses risk.

The NSS establishes homeland security as the first priority of the Nation. The Armed Forces' role in homeland security is complex, combining actions overseas and at home to **protect the United States**. Our first line of defense is abroad and includes mutually supporting activities with US allies to counter threats close to their source. Closer to home, the Armed Forces use their capabilities to secure strategic air, land, sea and space approaches to the United States and its territory. When directed, the Armed Forces employ military capabilities at home to protect the nation, the domestic population and critical infrastructure from direct attack. Protecting the United States also requires integrating military capabilities with other government and law enforcement agencies to manage the consequences of an attack or natural disaster.

The President and Secretary of Defense continue to highlight the increasingly dangerous nature and capabilities of adversaries. The threat posed by adversaries, especially those that possess WMD/E, is so great that the United States must adopt a global posture and take action to **prevent conflict and surprise attack**. Achieving this objective includes actions to shape the security environment in ways that enhance and expand multinational partnerships. Strong alliances and coalitions contribute to mutual security, tend to deter aggression, and help set conditions for success in combat if deterrence fails. Preventing conflict and surprise attack is not, however, solely defensive. The potentially catastrophic impact of an attack against the United States, its allies and its interests may necessitate actions in self-defense to preempt adversaries before they can attack.

Both the NSS and 2004 NDS envision a future environment that is safer and better than today. When called upon, the military must be prepared to contribute to this goal through campaigns to **prevail against adversaries**. While the Armed Forces' **foremost** task is to fight and **win** wars, the character of conflict has changed, necessitating capabilities to defeat a wide range of adversaries – from states to non-



state actors. The Armed Force must have the capability to swiftly defeat adversaries in overlapping campaigns while preserving the option to expand operations in one of those campaigns to achieve more comprehensive objectives. Prevailing against adversaries includes integrating all instruments of national power within a campaign to set the conditions for an enduring victory.

Achieving the objectives of **protect, prevent** and **prevail** requires connected joint operating concepts (JOCs) that provide direction on how the joint force will operate and a foundation for defining military capabilities. The JOCs describe how the Joint Force conducts key missions and are supported by functional concepts of **force application, protection, focused logistics, battlespace awareness** and **command and control**. The JOCs serve to guide the continuous transformation of the Armed Forces and provide a key linkage to the Armed Forces' vision<sup>2</sup> for future joint warfighting. **This** vision establishes the ultimate goal of the transformed force – the ability to achieve full spectrum dominance across the range of military operations.

### campaigns

- Campaigns to “swiftly defeat” the efforts of adversaries are undertaken to achieve a circumscribed set of objectives aimed at altering an adversary’s unacceptable behavior or policies, swiftly denying an adversary’s operational or strategic objectives, preventing attacks or uncontrolled conflict escalation and/or rapidly reestablishing security conditions favorable to the United States and its partners.
- Campaigns to “win decisively” are undertaken to bring about fundamental, favorable change in a crisis region and create enduring results. They likely entail lengthy periods of both major combat and stability operations; require regime change, defense, or restoration; and will include significant investments of the nation’s resources and time.

*2004 National Defense Strategy*

Achieving the objectives of the NMS in an uncertain and complex environment requires a capabilities-based approach to force design and planning that focuses less on a specific adversary or where a conflict might occur and more on how an adversary might fight. **This** capabilities-based approach uses operating concepts to drive planning and to guide the development of warfighting capabilities. It ensures the joint force can adapt and succeed across a broad range of scenarios. **This** approach must anticipate and rapidly adjust to changes in the security environment to ensure the United States improves its qualitative advantage over a more diverse set of adversaries – now and in the future.

The objectives of the NMS help define attributes and capabilities that the Joint Force requires and directly contribute to objectives of the 2004 NDS. These attributes and capabilities are important in determining the required size and design of the Armed Forces. Protecting the United States, preventing conflict and surprise attacks, and prevailing against adversaries will require forces appropriately sized and shaped in accordance with the NDS force-planning construct. The force must be sized to defend the US homeland while continuing to operate in and from four forward regions to deter aggression and coercion and set conditions for future operations. Even when committed to a limited number of lesser contingencies, the Armed Forces must retain



<sup>2</sup>The NMS integrates the document formerly known as “Joint Vision.”



the capability to swiftly defeat adversaries in two overlapping military campaigns. Additionally, when the President calls for an enduring result in one of the two, the force must have the capability and capacity to **win** decisively.

Combatant commands must consider the effect of their current posture when undertaking new operations. They will operate **within** a baseline security posture that includes the **WOT** and other ongoing operations from which they may be unable or unwilling to disengage. Planners must, therefore account for WOT campaign objectives when developing their force requirements.

### C. Key Aspects of the Security Environment

The United States faces a number of dangerous and pervasive threats. Traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges will require the Armed Forces to adjust quickly and decisively to change and anticipate emerging threats. Three key aspects of the security environment have unique implications for executing this military strategy and will drive the development of concepts and capabilities that ensure success in future operations.

#### 1. A Wider Range of Adversaries

Adversaries capable of threatening the United States, its allies, and its interests range from states to non-state organizations to individuals. There are states with traditional military forces and advanced systems, including cruise and ballistic missiles, which could seek to control key regions of the world. A few of these states are 'rogues' that violate treaties, secretly pursue and proliferate WMD/E, reject peaceful resolution of disputes and display callous disregard for their citizens. Some of these states sponsor terrorists, providing them financial support, sanctuary and access to dangerous capabilities. There are non-state actors, including terrorist networks, international criminal organizations and illegal armed groups that menace stability and security. Even some individuals may have the means and will to disrupt international order. Some of these adversaries are politically unconstrained and, particularly in the case of non-state actors, may be less susceptible to traditional means of deterrence. Adversaries increasingly seek asymmetric capabilities and will use them in innovative ways. They will avoid US strengths like precision strike and seek to counter US power projection capabilities by creating anti-access environments. Such adversaries will target civilian populations, economic centers and symbolic locations as a way to attack US political will and resolve.

#### Persistent and Emerging Challenges

**Traditional** challenges are largely represented by states employing legacy and advanced military capabilities and recognizable military forces, in long-established, well-known forms of military competition and conflict.

**Irregular** challenges are unconventional methods adopted and employed by non-state and state actors to counter stronger state opponents.

**Catastrophic** challenges involve the surreptitious acquisition, possession, and possible terrorist or rogue employment of WMD or methods producing WMD-like effects.

**Disruptive** future challenges are those likely to emanate from competitors developing, possessing, and employing breakthrough technological capabilities intended to supplant an opponent's advantages in particular operational domains.

*2004 National Defense Strategy*



This volatile mix of challenges requires new methods of deterrence and operational approaches to defeat these threats should deterrence fail. Intelligence systems must allow commanders to understand enemy intent, predict threat actions, and detect adversary movements, providing them the time necessary to take preventive measures. Long before conflict occurs these intelligence systems must help provide a more thorough understanding of adversaries' motivations, goals and organizations to determine effective deterrent courses of action. There may, however, be adversaries who remain undeterred. Should they acquire WMD/E or dangerous asymmetric capabilities, or demonstrate the intent to mount a surprise attack, the United States must be prepared to prevent them from striking.

## *2. A More Complex and **Distributed** Battlespace*

Adversaries threaten the United States throughout a complex battlespace, extending from critical regions overseas to the homeland and spanning the global commons of international airspace, waters, space and cyberspace. There exists an “arc of instability” stretching from the Western Hemisphere, through **Africa** and the Middle East and extending to Asia. There are areas in this arc that serve as breeding grounds for threats to our interests. Within these areas rogue states provide sanctuary to terrorists, protecting them from surveillance and attack. Other adversaries take advantage of ungoverned space and under-governed territories from which they prepare plans, train forces and launch attacks. These ungoverned areas often coincide with locations of illicit activities; such coincidence creates opportunities for hostile coalitions of criminal elements and ideological extremists. The United States **will** conduct operations in widely diverse locations – from densely populated urban areas located in littoral regions to remote, inhospitable and austere locations. Military operations in this complex environment may be dramatically different than the high intensity combat missions for which US forces routinely train. While US Armed Forces’ **will** continue to emphasize precision, speed, lethality and distributed operations, commanders must expect and plan for the possibility that their operations will produce unintended 2nd- and 3rd-order effects. For example, US forces can precisely locate, track, and destroy discrete targets to reduce collateral damage and conclude operations as quickly as possible. Operations that rely on precision may result in large elements of an adversary’s military remaining intact and segments of the population unaffected. Commanders must prepare to operate in regions where pockets of resistance remain and there exists the potential for continued combat operations amidst a large number of non-combatants.

**This** battlespace places unique demands on military organizations and interagency partners, requiring more detailed coordination and synchronization of activities both overseas and at home. Our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq highlight the need for a comprehensive strategy to achieve longer-term national goals and objectives. The United States must adopt an “active defense-in-depth” that merges joint force, interagency, international non-governmental organizations, and multinational capabilities in a synergistic manner. **This** defense does not rely solely on passive measures. The United States must enhance security at home while actively patrolling strategic approaches and extending defensive capabilities well beyond US borders. An effective defense-in-depth must also include the capability to strike swiftly at any





target around the globe using forces at home as well as forward-based, forward-deployed and rotational forces.

### **3. Technology *Diffusion and* Access**

Global proliferation of a wide range of technology and weaponry **will** affect the character of future conflict. Dual-use civilian technologies, especially information technologies, high-resolution imagery and global positioning systems are widely available. These relatively low cost, commercially available technologies will improve the disruptive and destructive capabilities of a wide range of state and non-state actors. Advances in automation and information processing will allow some adversaries to locate and attack targets both overseas and in the United States. Software tools for network-attack, intrusion and disruption are globally available over the Internet, providing almost any interested adversary a basic computer network exploitation or attack capability. Access to advanced weapons systems and innovative delivery systems could fundamentally change warfighting and dramatically increase an adversary's ability to threaten the United States.

Technology diffusion and access to advanced weapons and delivery systems have significant implications for military capabilities. The United States must have the ability to deny adversaries **such** disruptive technologies and weapons. However, the Armed Forces cannot focus solely on these threats and assume there are not other challenges on the horizon. Ensuring current readiness while continuing to transform and maintaining unchallenged military superiority will require investment. These are not mutually exclusive goals. The Armed Forces must remain ready to fight even as they transform and transform even as they fight. Adopting an "in-stride" approach to transformation – through rapid prototyping, field experimentation, organizational redesign and concept development – will ensure US military superiority remains unmatched. Such an approach requires effective balancing of resources to recapitalize critical capabilities and modernize some elements **of** the force to maintain readiness while investing in programs that extend US military advantages into the future.

## **D. Strategic Principles**

Commanders must develop plans that ensure they retain the agility to contend with uncertainty, apply effects decisively and integrate actions with other government agencies and multinational partners. Combatant commanders should consider these principles when planning and conducting operations. These principles guide the development of joint operations concepts and the capabilities the joint force requires.

### **1. Agility**

It is imperative that the Armed Forces retain the ability to contend with the principal characteristic of the security environment – uncertainty. Agility is the ability to rapidly deploy, employ, sustain and redeploy capabilities in geographically separated and environmentally diverse regions. As commanders conduct operations they must consider the effects of surprise and the possibility that their forces may have to transition from one type or phase of an operation to another quickly, or conduct phases simultaneously, regardless of location. Agility, as a planning



## DRAFT

principle, allows commanders to conduct simultaneous missions while retaining the ability to respond to emerging crises. Agility is key to quickly seizing the initiative across the range of military operations and ensuring the Armed Forces *can* act swiftly and decisively to protect US interests.

### 2. *Decisiveness*

Decisiveness allows combatant commanders to overwhelm adversaries, control situations and achieve definitive outcomes. Decisiveness requires tailored packages of joint capabilities designed to achieve specific effects and accomplish objectives. Achieving decisiveness may not require large force deployments but rather employing capabilities in innovative ways. Transforming the Armed Forces' capacity to mass effects while retaining the ability to mass forces, if needed, is key to achieving decisiveness. By focusing on decisive outcomes, combatant commanders can more precisely define the effects they must generate and determine the capabilities they require.

### 3. *Integration*

Commanders must ensure military activities are integrated effectively with the application of other instruments of national and international power to provide focus and unity of effort. Integration focuses on fusing and synchronizing military operations among the Services, other government agencies, the commercial sector, non-governmental organizations and those of partners abroad. Integration does not preclude the unilateral use of force, but rather seeks to ensure unity of effort and maximize the contribution of partners. Enabling multinational partners through security cooperation and other engagement activities enhances the ability of the Armed Forces to not only prevent conflict and deter aggression but also supports combatant commanders' plans to quickly undertake operations over great distances and in sometimes overlapping conflicts.

Agility, decisiveness, and integration support simultaneous operations, the application of overmatching power<sup>3</sup> and the fusion of US military power with other instruments of power. These principles stress speed, allowing US commanders to exploit an enemy's vulnerabilities, rapidly seize the initiative and achieve endstates. They support the concept of surging capabilities from widely dispersed locations to mass effects against an adversary's centers of gravity to achieve objectives. Our strategic principles guide the application of military power to protect, prevent and prevail in ways that contribute to longer-term national goals and objectives.

## 11. National Military Objectives

The 2004 NDS establishes four strategic objectives: secure the United States from direct attack; secure strategic access and maintain global freedom of action; establish security conditions conducive to a favorable international order; and strengthen alliances and partnerships to contend with common challenges. The NMS establishes



overmatching power is the precise application of combat power to foreclose enemy options and rapidly seize the initiative to achieve conclusive victories.

## DRAFT

three supporting military objectives: to **protect the United States** against external attacks and aggression; **prevent conflict and surprise attack**; and **prevail against adversaries**. These are the ends of the strategy and help to assure allies and friends, dissuade adversaries and deter aggression and coercion while ensuring the Armed Forces remain ready to defeat adversaries should deterrence and dissuasion fail. They serve as benchmarks to assess levels of risk and help to define the types and amounts of military capabilities required.

Joint operating concepts (JOCs), currently under development, support each objective and link specific tasks to programmatic actions as well as guide the development of plans and the execution of operations. The current set of JOCs – **Homeland Security, Stability Operations, Strategic Deterrence** and **Major Combat Operations** – represent related actions that support all of the NMS objectives. While some of the JOCs may focus on specific elements of the strategy, success requires integrated action and unity of effort across each of the concepts. Although military objectives have enduring elements, the ways to achieve those goals must evolve through experimentation, operational experience, and the development of transformational capabilities.

Several considerations will guide combatant commanders in their planning. First, NMS objectives are interrelated and require the application of capabilities across the tactical, operational and strategic spectrum. Each of the objectives will generally involve collaborative efforts with other agencies and departments in the US government. Second, commanders will need to develop plans to achieve objectives simultaneously. The ability to conduct simultaneous operations ensures the United States retains its initiative even during multiple operations. Finally, commanders cannot rely solely on reactive measures and a robust defensive posture to accomplish objectives. This strategy requires a posture of anticipatory self-defense, which reflects the need for prepared and proportional responses to imminent aggression. When directed, commanders **will** preempt in self-defense those adversaries that pose an unmistakable threat of grave harm and which are not otherwise deterrable.

### A. Protect the United States

Today, our first priority is to protect the United States. Joint forces help to secure the United States from direct attack through military activities overseas, planning and execution of homeland defense and support to civil authorities. Our experience in the WOT reinforces the fact that protecting the Nation and its global interests requires more than passive defensive measures. The threats posed by terrorist groups and rogue states, especially those that gain access to WMD/E, mandate an active defense-in-depth. Achieving this objective requires actions to counter threats overseas and close to their source; to secure our **air**, sea, space and land territorial approaches; and at home to defend against direct attacks. When directed, the Armed Forces provide military support to civil authorities, including capabilities to manage the consequences of an attack.

#### Applying Strategic Principles

Strategic agility, integration and decisiveness **allow** the Armed Forces to move at great speed and distance to undertake combat operations quickly in sometimes overlapping conflicts. They guide the development of tailored, joint operations concepts that define how the Armed Forces employ capabilities across the range of military operations.



**Countering Threats Close to their Source.** Our primary line of defense remains well forward. Forces operating in key regions are essential to the defense of the United States and to the protection of allies and US interests. Our theater security activities with multinational partners provide access to information and intelligence critical to anticipating and understanding new threats. **This** access supports the ability of the United States to project power against threats and support the establishment of an environment that reduces the conditions that foster extremist ideologies. Our forces, including those rotationally deployed and those stationed forward, will work cooperatively with other nations to encourage regional partners to eliminate threats and patrol ungoverned space. More directly, deployed **military** units will work closely with international partners and other US government agencies to take the battle to the enemy – engaging terrorist forces, terrorist collaborators and those governments harboring terrorists.

**Protecting Strategic Approaches.** The JOC for “Homeland Security” includes tasks to protect the United States from direct attack while securing the **air**, sea, land and space approaches to the United States. We will join the efforts of multinational partners and other US government agencies to form an integrated defense of the **air**, land, sea and space approaches in and around US sovereign territory. Protecting these strategic approaches requires persistent surveillance that allows the United States to identify, continuously track and interdict potential threats. **This** integrated defense is essential to securing strategic access and retaining US freedom of action.

**Defensive Actions at Home.** While we will attempt to counter threats close to their source and interdict them along the strategic approaches, we must retain the ability to defend the United States from an attack that penetrates our forward defenses. At home the Armed Forces must defend the United States against **air** and missile attacks, terrorism and other direct attacks. **As** necessary, the Armed Forces will protect critical infrastructure that supports our ability to project military power. When directed, the Armed Forces will temporarily employ military capabilities to support law enforcement agencies during special events. During emergencies the Armed Forces may provide military support to civil authorities in mitigating the consequences of an attack or other catastrophic event when civilian responders are overwhelmed. Military responses under these conditions require a streamlined chain-of-command that integrates the unique capabilities of active and reserve military components and civilian responders. Effective defense in the face of adaptive adversaries will also require the exploitation of future technologies to improve capabilities to rapidly detect, assess and interdict WMD/E and emerging threats.

**Creating a Global Anti-Terrorism Environment.** In addition to defending the US homeland and supporting **civil** authorities, our strategy will diminish the conditions that permit terrorism to flourish. To defeat terrorists we will support national and partner nation efforts to deny state sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorist organizations. We **will** work to deny terrorists safe haven in failed states and ungoverned regions. Working with other nations’ militaries and other governmental agencies, the Armed Forces help to establish favorable security conditions and increase the capabilities of partners. The relationships developed in these interactions contribute to a global antiterrorism environment that further reduces threats to the



United States, its allies and its interests. For example, intelligence partnerships with other nations can take advantage of foreign expertise and areas of focus and provide access to previously denied areas. These relationships are essential mission components to protecting the United States, contributing to deterrence and conflict prevention, as well as preventing surprise attacks.

## **B. Prevent Conflict and Surprise Attacks**

The United States must prevent conflict and surprise attacks through actions that deter aggression and coercion while retaining the capability to act promptly in defending the nation. Preventing conflict and deterring aggression rely in large part on an integrated overseas presence. Overseas, US forces permanently based in strategically important areas, rotationally deployed forward in support of regional objectives, and temporarily deployed during contingencies convey a credible message that the United States remains committed to preventing conflict. These forces also clearly demonstrate that the United States **will** react forcefully should an adversary threaten the United States, its interests, allies and partners. The United States must remain vigilant in identifying conditions that can lead to conflict in anticipating adversary actions and in reacting more swiftly than in the past. The Joint Force **will** deploy forward with a purpose – on the ground, in the **air**, in space and at sea – and work with other nations to promote security and to deter aggression. Preventing conflict and surprise attacks requires that the Armed Forces take action to ensure strategic access, establish favorable security conditions and work to increase the capabilities of partners to protect common security interests.

**Forward Posture and Presence.** Increasing the capabilities of partners and their willingness to cooperate in operations that ensure regional security requires an integrated, global view of our long-term strategy and enhancements to our overseas military posture. Combatant commanders, employing a mix of forward stationed, rotational and temporarily deployed capabilities tailored to perform specific missions, improve our ability to act within and across borders, strengthen the role of partners and expand joint and multinational capabilities. Posture and presence enhancements also serve to assure our friends; improve the ability to prosecute the WOT; deter, dissuade and defeat other threats; and support transformation. These changes, developed in anticipation of future threats, help to ensure strategic access to key regions and lines of communications critical to US security and sustaining operations throughout the battlespace. Within the process of adjusting our overseas presence, combatant commanders must develop and recommend posture adjustments that enable expeditionary, joint, and multinational forces to act promptly and globally while establishing favorable security conditions. The value and utility of having forces forward goes beyond winning on the battlefield. Employing forces in instances short of war demonstrates the United States' willingness to lead and encourages others to help defend, preserve and extend the peace.

**Promote Security.** The visible and purposeful presence of US military capabilities is an integral part of an active global strategy to ensure security and stability. Military forces engage in security cooperation (SC) activities to establish important military interactions, building trust and confidence between the United States and its multinational partners. These relatively small investments often produce results that





## DRAFT

far exceed their cost. SC complements other national-level efforts to prevent conflict and promote mutual security interests. These activities encourage nations to develop, modernize and transform their own capabilities, thereby increasing the capabilities of partners and helping them to help themselves. SC helps resolve doctrinal employment differences among military counterparts, enhances important intelligence and communication linkages and facilitates rapid crisis response. Active SC contributes to stability in key areas of the world while dissuading potential adversaries from adopting courses of action that threaten stability and security. In this way, we facilitate the integration of military operations with allies, contribute to regional stability, reduce underlying conditions that foment extremism and set the conditions for future success.

**Detering Aggression.** Deterrence rests on an adversary understanding that the United States has an unquestioned ability to deny strategic objectives and to impose severe consequences in response to hostile or potentially hostile actions. Detering aggression and coercion must be anticipatory in nature to prevent the catastrophic impact of attacks using biological, chemical or nuclear weapons on civilian population centers in the United States or in partner nations. The Armed Forces have the capability to exercise flexible deterrent options (FDOs) with appropriate combat power to defuse a crisis or force an adversary to reevaluate its courses of action. Combatant commanders build upon the capabilities of early arriving **FDOs** to support the swift defeat of an adversary when necessary. Moreover, they employ capabilities to establish favorable security conditions in which other, non-military FDOs *can* succeed. Effective deterrence requires a strategic communication plan that emphasizes the willingness of the United States to employ force in defense of its interests. The participation of combatant commanders is essential in developing a strategic communication plan that conveys US intent and objectives, and ensures the success of the plan by countering adversary disinformation and misinformation. **Such** strategic communication can help avoid conflict or deescalate tensions among adversaries.

The United States requires a broad set **of** options to discourage aggression and coercion. Nuclear capabilities continue to play an important role in deterrence by providing military options to deter a range of threats, including the use of WMD/E and large-scale conventional forces. Additionally, the extension of a credible nuclear deterrent to allies has been an important nonproliferation tool that has removed incentives for allies to develop and deploy nuclear forces. Detering aggression by a wider range of adversaries requires transforming existing US strategic nuclear forces into a new triad composed of a diverse portfolio of capabilities. This new model for strategic deterrence includes non-nuclear and nuclear strike forces, active and passive defenses, as well as infrastructure to build and maintain the force. Improvements and enhancements to non-nuclear strike capabilities, information operations, command and control, intelligence and space forces will contribute to a more robust and effective deterrent capability. Future advances in targeting and precision **will** provide the capabilities necessary to defeat a wider range of targets while reducing collateral damage.



**Preventing Surprise Attacks.** Military forces can no longer focus solely on responding to aggression. The potentially horrific consequences of an attack against



the United States demand action to secure the Nation from direct attack by eliminating certain threats before they **can** strike. Deterring threats and preventing surprise attacks will place increasing demands on intelligence assets, the agility and decisiveness of the force and the ability to work time-critical issues in the interagency setting. Preventative missions require shared, “actionable” intelligence, and rules of engagement that allow commanders to make timely decisions. This decision making process stresses collaboration, speed and responsiveness – key ingredients required when exploiting time-sensitive opportunities as they arise, especially against mobile, time critical targets. These missions require exacting analysis and synthesis of intelligence gathered by a combination of capabilities, including human and technical collectors. These operations will generally involve coordinated efforts with other agencies and departments in the US government, placing a premium on information sharing, intelligence fusion and collaborative planning.

JOCs for **stability operations** and **strategic deterrence** are essential to how combatant commanders employ forces before, during and after conflict. Preventing conflict requires the capability to perform stability operations to maintain or re-establish order, promote peace and security or improve existing conditions. **This will** involve close coordination with other elements of the US government and multinational partners. Such actions reduce the underlying conditions that foster terrorism and the extremist ideologies that support terrorism. Stability operations create favorable security conditions that allow other instruments of national and international power to succeed. Preventing conflict and surprise attacks is a key element to protecting the United States **from** direct attack and helps to set the conditions in which the Armed Forces can prevail against adversaries.

### C. Prevail Against Adversaries

When necessary, the Armed Forces **will** defeat adversaries. Developments in the security environment necessitate a Joint Force that can achieve tactical and operational success and prevail in a manner that establishes favorable security conditions and ensures enduring victories. Terrorist attacks demonstrate that conflict is not limited to geographic borders and that defeating root causes of terrorism requires a total national effort. The United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community and increase the capabilities of partners to contend with common challenges, but will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary.

**Swiftly Defeat Adversaries.** Some operation plans will focus on achieving a limited set of objectives. Commanders’ plans to swiftly defeat adversaries **will** include options to: alter the unacceptable behavior or policies of states; rapidly seize the initiative or prevent conflict escalation; deny an adversary sanctuary, defeat his offensive capabilities or objectives; and provide support to post-conflict stability. In each case, the Joint Force must combine speed, agility and superior warfighting ability to generate decisive effects. Moving forces into multiple geographic locations will require assured strategic access as well as strategic and tactical lift systems robust enough to conduct and sustain multiple, simultaneous operations. Swiftly defeating adversaries in overlapping operations will require the ability to quickly reconstitute, reconfigure and redeploy forces to conduct another campaign.



**Win Decisively.** Where necessary, commanders' plans will include options to rapidly transition to a campaign to **win** decisively and achieve enduring results. The capabilities required for major combat operations must be applicable to the full spectrum of threats ranging from state to non-state adversaries employing traditional and/or asymmetric capabilities. A campaign to **win** decisively **will** include actions to: destroy an adversary's military capabilities through the integrated application of air, ground, maritime, space and information capabilities; and potentially remove adversary regimes when directed. Such campaigns require capabilities for conventional warfighting, unconventional warfare, homeland security, stability and post-conflict operations, countering terrorism and security cooperation activities.

**Stability Operations.** Winning decisively will require synchronizing and integrating major combat operations, stability operations and significant post-conflict interagency operations to establish conditions of stability and security favorable to the United States. The Joint Force must be able to transition from major combat operations to stability operations and to conduct those operations simultaneously. At the operational level, military post-conflict operations **will** integrate conflict termination objectives with diplomatic, economic, financial, intelligence, law enforcement and information efforts. Joint forces will, where appropriate, synchronize and coordinate their operations and activities with international partners and non-governmental organizations. These missions render other instruments of national power more effective and set the conditions for long-term regional stability and sustainable development.

The JOCs for **major combat operations** and **stability operations** are complementary and must be fully integrated and synchronized in campaign planning. These concepts allow the Joint Force to conduct sequential, parallel or simultaneous operations throughout the physical and information domains of the global battlespace. The goal of these **JOCs** is to sustain increased operating tempo, place continuous pressure on the adversary and synchronize military action with the application of other instruments of national power.

## **111. A Joint Force for Mission Success**

The objectives of protect, prevent and prevail provide the foundation for defining military capabilities and creating a joint force that can contend effectively with uncertainty. They support a capabilities-based approach that focuses on how adversaries will fight in the future rather than on which specific adversaries we may fight. The Armed Forces must have the ability to defeat opponents that possess WMD/E, combine both low-tech and high-tech capabilities and merge traditional and asymmetric capabilities in an attempt to overcome US military advantages.

Defeating adaptive adversaries requires flexible, modular and deployable joint forces with the ability to combine the strengths of individual Services, combatant commands, other government agencies and multinational partners. Joint forces will require new levels of interoperability and systems that are "born joint," i.e., conceptualized and designed with joint architectures and acquisition strategies. This level of interoperability ensures that technical, doctrinal and cultural barriers do not limit the ability of joint commanders to achieve objectives. The goal is to design joint



force capabilities that increase the range of options – from kinetic to non-kinetic – available to the President and Secretary of Defense.

## A. Desired Attributes

The challenge over the next decade will be to develop and enhance joint capabilities in a time of global war, finite resources and multiple commitments. While the United States enjoys an overwhelming qualitative advantage today, sustaining and increasing this advantage will require transformation - a transformation achieved by combining technology, intellect and cultural changes across the joint community. The Armed Forces must be able to evaluate challenges, leverage innovation and technology and act decisively in pursuit of national goals.

Joint forces operating in this complex battlespace must be fully integrated and adaptable to anticipate and counter the most dangerous threats. They will also require expeditionary capabilities with highly mobile forces skilled in flexible, adaptive planning and decentralized execution even when operating from widely dispersed locations. Operational planning and execution requires decision superiority and the prerequisite authority to take actions and exploit fleeting opportunities. The joint force will use superior intelligence and the power of information technologies to increase decision superiority, precision and lethality of the force. A networked force capable of decision superiority can collect, analyze and rapidly disseminate intelligence and other relevant information from the national to tactical levels, then use that information to decide and act faster than opponents.

### Joint Force Attributes (Characteristics Describing the Joint Force)

- **Fully** Integrated — functions and capabilities focused toward a unified purpose.
- Expeditionary — rapidly deployable, employable and sustainable throughout the global battlespace.
- Networked — linked and synchronized in time and purpose.
- Decentralized — integrated capabilities operating in a joint manner at lower echelons.
- Adaptable — prepared to quickly respond with the appropriate capabilities *mix*.
- Decision superiority — better-informed decisions implemented faster than an adversary can react.
- **Lethality** — destroy an adversary and/or his systems in **all** conditions.

Joint Operations Concepts

A joint force with these attributes requires more than technological solutions. It relies on disciplined, skilled, dedicated and professional service men and women. It also requires informed and empowered joint leaders who combine superior technical skills, operational experience, intellectual understanding and cultural expertise to employ capabilities and perform critical joint functions. A joint force, possessing the attributes described and comprised of highly motivated professionals, will produce creative solutions to the most difficult problems.

## B. Functions and Capabilities

Inherent in each military objective is a series of functions that the Joint Force must perform. Commanders derive their tasks and define required capabilities through an analysis of these functions and the concepts that describe how the Armed Forces will



perform them. Capabilities that allow the Joint Force to perform these functions result from combinations of joint doctrine, organization, training programs, materiel solutions, leadership, personnel and facilities.

## 1. Applying *Force*

The application of military force to achieve the objectives of the NMS is the primary task of the Armed Forces. It requires the integrated use of maneuver and engagement to create precisely defined effects. Force application includes force movement to gain positional and temporal advantage to rapidly seize the initiative and complicate an adversary's defensive plans. Force application integrates **air**, land, sea, special operations, information and space capabilities. It also requires unprecedented levels of persistence that allow commanders, even in a high-threat environment, to assess results against mission objectives, adjust capabilities accordingly and reengage as required.

Applying force requires power projection assets to move capabilities rapidly, employ them precisely and **sustain** them even when adversaries employ anti-access and counter power projection strategies. Such power projection requires assured access to theaters of operation and enhanced expeditionary capabilities that support operational maneuver from strategic distances. Strong regional alliances and coalitions enhance expeditionary capabilities by providing physical access to host nation infrastructure and other support. They also provide access to regional intelligence that enables the precise application of military capabilities and allows the United States to focus combat power more effectively at the critical time and place. Achieving shared situational awareness with allies and partners will require compatible information systems and security processes that protect sensitive information without degrading the ability of multinational partners to operate effectively with US elements. Such information and intelligence sharing helps build trust and confidence essential to strong international partnerships.

Force application focuses more on generating the right effects to achieve objectives than on generating overwhelming numbers of forces. The application of force against widely dispersed adversaries, including transnational terrorist organizations, **will** require improved intelligence collection and analysis systems. Effective global strike to damage, neutralize or destroy any objective results from a combination of precision and maneuver and the integration of new technologies, doctrine and organizations. Defeating the most dangerous threats will require persistence in force application that allows strikes against time-sensitive and time-critical targets. Ensuring capabilities are positioned and ready to conduct strikes against these targets requires the ability to sustain operations over time and across significant distances.

## 2. Deploying *and* Sustaining *Military* Capabilities

Force application in multiple overlapping operations will challenge sustainment capabilities. Sustaining such operations requires the ability to support forces operating in and from austere or unimproved forward locations. Additionally, the increasing importance of mobility will necessitate more expeditionary logistics capabilities. Focused logistics provides the right personnel, equipment and supplies



in the right quantities and at the right place and time. Such focused logistics capabilities will place a premium on networking to create a seamless end-to-end logistics system that synchronizes **all** aspects of the deployment and distribution processes.

Overlapping major combat operations place major demands on strategic mobility. Achieving objectives in such operations requires robust sealift, airlift, aerial refueling and pre-positioned assets. Strategic mobility that supports these operations also requires supporting equipment to store, move and distribute materiel and an information infrastructure to provide real-time visibility of the entire logistics chain.

Sustainment includes force generation and management activities that ensure the long-term viability of the force. Force generation includes recruiting, training, educating and retaining highly qualified people in the Active and Reserve Components as well as within the DOD civilian and contracted workforce. These personnel must have the right skill sets to apply joint doctrine within their organizations. Force generation requirements must include planning, programming, acquisition, maintenance, repair and recapitalization of equipment and infrastructure to maintain readiness.

Force management contributes to improving readiness levels even during high-intensity operations. It considers the effects of modernization and transformation on unit availability, readiness and integration. Force management policies, including force rotation policies that reduce stress on the joint force, evolve from continuous assessments of operational requirements. They also help to determine the appropriate locations, capabilities and associated infrastructure required to support multiple, simultaneous operations. Force management policies help define the right mix of Active and Reserve Component forces and ensure a proper balance of capabilities.

### ***3. Securing Battlespace***

The Armed Forces must have the ability to operate across the **air**, land, sea, space and cyberspace domains of the battlespace. Armed Forces must employ military capabilities to ensure access to these domains to protect the Nation, forces in the field and US global interests. The non-linear nature of the current security environment requires multi-layered active and passive measures to counter numerous diverse conventional and asymmetric threats. These include conventional weapons, ballistic and cruise missiles and WMD/E. They also include threats in cyberspace aimed at networks and data critical to US information-enabled systems. Such threats require a comprehensive concept of deterrence encompassing traditional adversaries, terrorist networks and rogue states able to employ any range of capabilities.

The Armed Forces require new capabilities to detect and interdict a wide range of threats close to their source and throughout the strategic approaches. The availability of intelligence and dual use technology to a wider variety of potential adversaries poses an increasing danger, providing them the ability to interrupt or exploit US information systems. Adversaries may find new and innovative ways to combine capabilities into effective weapons and enhance their ability to threaten the United States. Military forces must have both the means and established rules of engagement to take action





ranging from active counter proliferation to military action that supports non-proliferation policies. Securing battlespace will require cooperative activities with other government agencies and multinational partners to deny the use of these capabilities and to counter asymmetric attacks. **This** requires doctrine, tools and training to more effectively synchronize *military* capabilities with non-DOD assets.

Consequence management capabilities are essential in the aftermath of an attack, especially an attack with WMD/E. Such capabilities limit damage and casualties and include actions to counter the effects of WMD/E or the intentional or unintentional release of toxic chemicals following military operations. Consequence management helps restore affected areas through actions that contain, neutralize and decontaminate weapon agents. When directed, the Joint Force will extend consequence management assistance to allies and other security partners.

Military operations require information assurance that guarantees access to information systems and their products and the ability to deny adversaries access to the same. Securing the battlespace includes actions to safeguard information and command and control systems that support the precise application of force and sustainment activities that ensure persistence across the **full** range of military operations. Securing battlespace ensures the ability of the Armed Forces to collect, process, analyze and disseminate all-source intelligence and other relevant information that contribute to decision superiority.

#### ***4. Achieving Decision Superiority***

Decision superiority – the process of making decisions better and faster than an adversary – is essential to executing a strategy based on speed and flexibility. Decision superiority requires new ways of thinking about acquiring, integrating, using and sharing information. It necessitates new ideas for developing architectures for command, control, communications and computers (C4) as well as the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets that provide knowledge of adversaries. Decision superiority requires precise information of enemy and friendly dispositions, capabilities, and activities, as well as other data relevant to successful campaigns. Battlespace awareness, combined with responsive command and control systems, supports dynamic decision-making and turns information superiority into a competitive advantage adversaries cannot match.

Persistent surveillance, ISR management, collaborative analysis and on-demand dissemination facilitate battlespace awareness. Developing the intelligence products to support this level of awareness requires collection systems and assured access to **air**, land, sea and space-based sensors. Human collectors are a critical element in the collection system; they provide the ability to discern the intention of adversaries and produce actionable intelligence for plans and orders. Intelligence analysts operating well forward must have the ability to reach back to comprehensive, integrated databases and to horizontally integrate information and intelligence. The entire system must be supported by effective counterintelligence capabilities that deny an adversary access to critical information.





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Battlespace awareness requires the ability to share relevant information with other government agencies and allies. Such information sharing requires multi-level security capabilities that allow multinational partners and other government agencies to access and use relevant information while reducing the probability of compromise. Seamless multi-level security access will empower distributed command and control and provide increased transparency in multinational operations. Decisions to apply force in multiple, widely dispersed locations require highly flexible and adaptive joint command and control processes. Commanders must communicate decisions to subordinates, rapidly develop alternative courses of action, generate required effects, assess results and conduct appropriate follow-on operations.

The Joint Force requires the ability to conduct information operations, including electronic warfare, computer network operations, military deception, psychological operations and operations security that enable information superiority. Information operations must be adaptive – tailorable to specific audiences and requirements and flexible enough to accommodate operational adjustments. Should deterrence fail, information operations can disrupt an enemy's network and communications-dependent weapons, infrastructure and command and control and battlespace management functions. Information operations, both offensive and defensive, are key to ensuring US freedom of action across the battlespace.

A decision superior joint force must employ decision-making processes that allow commanders to attack time-sensitive and time-critical targets. Dynamic decision-making brings together organizations, planning processes, technical systems and commensurate authorities that support informed decisions. Such decisions require networked command and control capabilities and a tailored common operating picture of the battlespace. Networking must also provide increased transparency in multinational operations and support the integration of other government agencies and multinational partners into joint operations. Force application, sustainment and actions to secure battlespace will rely on these capabilities.



## IV. Force Design and Size

### A. Force Design and Size

The 2004 NDS directs a force sized to defend the homeland, deter forward in and from four regions, and conduct two, overlapping “~~swift~~defeat” campaigns. Even when committed to a limited number of lesser contingencies, the force must be able to “win decisively” in one of the two campaigns. This “1-4-2-1” force-sizing construct places a premium on increasingly innovative and efficient methods to achieve objectives. The construct establishes mission parameters for the most demanding set of potential scenarios and encompasses the full range of military operations. It does not represent a specific set of scenarios nor reflect temporary conditions. ~~As~~ a result, planners and programmers should take into account the following implications of the construct.

**Baseline Security Posture.** Combatant commanders will perform their missions within a baseline security posture that includes the WOT, ongoing operations and other day-to-day activities to which US forces remain committed and from which they are unlikely to disengage entirely. The extremely demanding circumstances associated with the ongoing WOT are likely to endure for the foreseeable future. Because post-conflict and WOT operations are likely of long duration and will vary in intensity, planners must account for the capabilities required to achieve campaign objectives. Commanders must develop options to achieve success given this baseline security posture and identify capability trade-offs necessary to manage increased risks.

**Adequacy and Presence.** Determining the size of the force requires assessing the adequacy of the force to meet current and future challenges and the optimization of current end strength and force/capabilities mix. Sizing the force must consider the allocation, location, distribution and support of overseas forces. Sizing must account for sustaining permanently stationed, rotationally and temporarily deployed forward forces; overseas infrastructure; and resources, including the strategic lift and security necessary to project and sustain these capabilities over time. Some crises may prove more difficult than anticipated or may escalate quickly. Reducing this risk and ensuring the ability of the Armed Forces to prevail will require “early-entry” capabilities forward for rapid action, while relying on surge capacity to provide follow-on forces.

**Disengagement.** While the force-planning construct assumes that the United States will disengage from some contingencies when faced with a second overlapping campaign, there may be some lesser contingencies that the United States is unwilling or unable to terminate quickly. There may be forces conducting long-term stability operations to reestablish favorable post conflict security conditions from which the United States cannot disengage. Under such circumstance some important capabilities may not be readily available at the outset of a subsequent conflict. Combatant commanders must consider this possibility when preparing to undertake operations, as many of the same capabilities critical to campaigns are required to conduct lesser contingency operations.

**Escalation.** Actions to size the force must take into account the fact that lesser contingencies have the potential to escalate to more demanding campaigns. Providing



a wider range of military options during crises requires a force sized for a probable level of commitment across the full range of military operations – while ensuring that continued commitment to such contingencies does not preclude the ability of the United States to conduct major campaigns.

**Force Generation and Transformation.** Force sizing and design must look beyond current operations. The health of the force rests on the ability to generate, sustain and transform capabilities over the long term. Sizing the force must include an appreciation of the force requirements to support ongoing training activities, “in-stride” transformation and other programs that may restrict the availability of forces and capabilities provided to combatant commanders. Assessments of acceptable levels of risk will dictate the type and kinds of capabilities that Armed Forces must possess to surge to meet the most demanding set of requirements.

## **B. Risk and Force Assessments**

Given current force levels and appropriate resources, this strategy is executable. While US conventional military capabilities are, and will likely remain, unmatched for the foreseeable future, demands on the Armed Forces across the range of military operations remain considerable. Pursuing the WOT, conducting stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, ensuring power projection from the Homeland and sustaining global commitments while protecting the long-term health of the Armed Forces will require actions to mitigate risk. Commanders must develop options to balance demands like transformation, modernization and recapitalization that, if unrealized over the longer-term, could make it increasingly difficult to execute this military strategy. Annex A provides a complete assessment of risk and mitigation options.

At present, the Armed Forces remain optimized for high-intensity conflict and combat operations in mature theaters. Our experience in the WOT has provided insights on both the strengths and deficiencies in our concepts for employing military force as well as some of the capabilities the Armed Forces must improve. The Armed Forces remain fully capable of conducting major combat operations and a range of lesser contingencies. While we have adapted these forces successfully in OEF and OIF, success in future operations will require further and more substantive changes. Additionally, changes in the security environment will necessitate adaptations in the Joint Force. These changes include evolution of threats and an assessment of the ability of our allies and partners to contribute capabilities in support of US operational requirements. Annex B contains a more detailed regional assessment and includes projected allied and partner contributions to achieving the objectives of the NMS.

## **V. Joint Vision for Future Warfighting**

The attributes and capabilities of the Joint Force provide the foundation for the force of the future. They provide the basis for adjustments to organizational design and doctrine as changes and challenges arise. They support the goals of the Department of Defense in ways that complement other instruments of national power. The goal is full spectrum dominance (FSD)– the ability to control any situation or defeat any adversary across the range of military operations.



## A. Full Spectrum Dominance

FSD is the overarching concept for applying force today and provides a vision for future joint operations. Achieving FSD requires the Armed Forces to focus transformation efforts on key capability areas that enhance the ability of the joint force to achieve success across the range of military operations. FSD requires joint military capabilities, operating concepts, functional concepts and critical enablers adaptable to diverse conditions and objectives.

FSD recognizes the need to integrate military activities **with** those of other government agencies, the importance of interoperability with allies and other partners and the criticality of transforming in-stride.

FSD will serve to strengthen the trust and confidence that exists among Service components by acknowledging their interdependence and developing concepts that reduce gaps and seams among organizations. It requires a capabilities-based approach that balances near-term capabilities with longer-term requirements and incorporates a global perspective on military and strategic risk. This integrative concept ensures military forces possess capabilities to rapidly conduct globally dispersed, simultaneous operations; foreclose adversary options; and, if required, generate the desired effects necessary to decisively defeat adversaries.

Along with technological solutions to improve joint warfighting, we must also examine our doctrine, organizations, training systems, materiel procurement, leadership preparation, personnel programs and facilities to ensure military superiority. This requires a more holistic approach to countering today's threats and preparing for those likely to emerge in the future. Reducing lead times associated **with** research, development and fielding of new capabilities must be a priority. Such actions are essential to an in-stride approach to transforming the Joint Force and executing concepts for future joint warfighting. Research and development programs are equally important to FSD, providing a hedge against the more uncertain aspects of the security environment.

## B. Initiatives

The Services and combatant commands are actively involved in a number of initiatives to ensure military superiority. US Armed Forces must remain superior to any other nation's while engaging in interagency and international efforts that continue to set the conditions to protect the United States and **win the WOT**. The following initiatives represent some of the ongoing activities that enhance joint warfighting and support transformation.

### Focusing Transformation

The 2004 National Defense Strategy identifies eight capability areas that "provide a transformation focus for the Department."

- Strengthening Intelligence
- Protecting Critical Bases of Operation
- Operating from the Commons: Space, International Waters and Airspace, and Cyberspace
- Projecting **and** Sustaining US Forces in Distant Anti-Access Environments
- Denying Enemies Sanctuary
- Conducting Network-Centric Operations
- Improving Proficiency for Irregular Warfare
- Increasing Capabilities of Partners – International and Domestic



## DRAFT

**Organizational Adaptation.** Adaptive organizations must be more modular and support rapid reconfiguration of joint capabilities for specific missions. Modular forces build on the core competencies of each Service component while enhancing the strength of joint operations. Organizational adaptation will require actions to balance Active and Reserve Components to sustain an appropriate mix of capabilities. Additionally, the creation of Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) will provide the core capability for a Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters within each combatant command. SJFHQs facilitate rapid employment of cross-service capabilities to respond to contingencies and crises around the world. Selectively manned, trained, and equipped, these SJFHQs will have the tools to operate effectively in any contingency. At the same time, the creation of a Joint National Training Capability will allow the Joint Force to train and gain experience at the tactical and operational levels of warfare. Once established, it will provide realistic training for joint forces and support battlespace awareness functions. **This** new training capability will better prepare the Joint Force for asymmetric challenges and a diverse array of threats.

**Interagency Integration and Information Sharing.** Implementing Counter-Terrorist (CT) Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) at five regional and two global combatant commands facilitates interagency integration. The JIACGs are multifunctional elements that have dramatically increased information sharing across the interagency community. Continuing the experimentation process supports the Armed Forces' goal to develop and field a "full spectrum" JIACG that will tap interagency expertise to address the many transnational issues facing the combatant commanders. In the near term the Armed Forces will facilitate information sharing and common situational awareness between elements of the JIACG with the DOD standard collaboration toolset that enables virtual collaboration. Interagency integration enables a strategic communications plan that includes elements of public affairs and public diplomacy. In addition to military information operations, this strategic communication plan ensures unity of themes and messages, emphasizes success, accurately confirms or refutes external reporting on US operations, and reinforces the legitimacy of US goals. Combatant commanders must be actively involved in the development, execution and support of this strategic communication campaign.

**Global Information Grid.** The DOD is further developing a fully interoperable, interagency-wide global information grid (GIG). The GIG has the potential to be the single most important enabler of information and decision superiority. The GIG supports the creation of a collaborative information environment that facilitates information sharing, effective synergistic planning, and execution of simultaneous, overlapping operations. It will be a globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes, and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating and managing information on demand to defense policymakers, warfighters and support personnel. Other initiatives include the transformation of battlespace awareness systems to include the Operational Net Assessment (ONA) Concept, the Multinational Information Sharing (MNIS) Transformation Change Package (TCP) and several Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs). They respectively address information and knowledge for decision-making; technical, policy, and organization issues; and innovative





capabilities. These activities are among the ongoing efforts related to improving information sharing among coalition partners.

**Intelligence Campaign Planning.** Achieving decision superiority in a dynamic environment requires the synchronization and integration of all sources of intelligence and information to include those from DOD and non-DOD agencies, law enforcement and multinational partners. Intelligence support must also be continuous across the entire spectrum of conflict, and span the range of **all** military operations from daily cooperative security and **WOT** requirements: pre-hostility, crisis, and major combat operations: to post-conflict stability operations. Intelligence operations strategies that support conflict prevention, mitigate against surprise attack, and position intelligence to best answer warfighting needs are an essential element of **this** support. Intelligence campaign plans implement these strategies by defining the comprehensive intelligence needs for all phases of operations and campaigns, including intelligence all-source analysis and production, multi-discipline collection, processing, and supporting information architecture. Such plans also provide for the widest possible dissemination and sharing of relevant information to ensure national and international unity of effort without compromising security. By addressing **all** aspects of intelligence operations, these plans focus the intelligence capabilities of the Department and the broader intelligence community on providing the critical information that leads to decision superiority.

**Enhancing Overseas Presence Posture.** An integrated global presence and basing strategy provides the context for actions that enhance warfighting while strengthening and expanding the United States' network of partnerships. Such a strategy provides rationale for adjustments in permanent and rotational presence, prepositioned equipment, global sourcing and surge capabilities that support these goals. Posture adjustments must support winning the WOT while setting the conditions that will ensure an enduring peace. Enhancing US overseas presence and global footprint must improve the ability of regional forces to employ an expeditionary approach in response to regional and global contingencies. They must remain "scaleable," supporting plans to surge forces during crises when and where they are needed. Modifications to US overseas presence and posture must enhance the Armed Forces' ability to deal with uncertainty, enable rapid operations and allow forces to respond with greater speed than in the past. US overseas presence must also improve conditions in key regions and support conflict prevention. **An** integrated global presence and basing strategy serves to strengthen existing alliances while helping to create new partnerships. Strengthening regional alliances and coalitions helps to create favorable regional balances of power that help bring pressure to bear on hostile or uncooperative regimes. Multinational partnerships expand opportunities for coalition building through combined training, experimentation and transformation. **An** integrated global presence and basing strategy will expand the range of pre-conflict options to deter aggression and control conflict escalation while setting the conditions for a sustainable peace.

**Joint Leader Development.** We continue to improve joint professional military education to provide more joint experiences, education and training to warfighters – junior and senior officers and noncommissioned officers. At the senior officer level, a modified capstone course will increase the emphasis on jointness while preparing





senior officers to lead joint task forces and other joint operations. For junior officers and noncommissioned officers, incorporating joint education and training early in their careers ensures future leaders **will** more effectively integrate tactical operations with interagency and multinational components.

## VI. Conclusion

This strategy focuses the Armed Forces on winning the **WOT** and enhancing joint warfighting while supporting actions to create a joint, network-centric, distributed force, capable of full spectrum dominance. Achieving decision superiority and generating tailored effects across the battlespace allows the Joint Force to control any situation over a range of military operations. To succeed, the Armed Forces must integrate Service capabilities in new and innovative, reduce seams between combatant commands and develop more collaborative relationships with partners at home and abroad.

The NMS defines specific tasks for the Joint Force that allow commanders to assess military and strategic risk. It guides adjustments to plans and programs to generate, employ and sustain joint capabilities effectively. Additionally, it provides insights on operational matters, institutional issues, force management programs, future challenges and recommends courses of action to mitigate risk.

While engaged in multiple worldwide operations to meet these requirements, the Armed Forces of the United States must maintain force quality, enhance joint warfighting capabilities and transform to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Executing this strategy will require a truly joint, full spectrum force – with a seamless mix of active forces, the Reserve Component, DOD civilians, and contracted workforce – fully grounded in a culture of innovation. It **will** require the highest quality people – disciplined, dedicated, professional – well trained, well educated, and well led.

Appropriately resourced, this strategy will achieve the goals of the **NSS** and 2004 NDS, effectively balancing military and strategic **risk** over the long term. It will enable us to counter the threats of today and transform the Joint Force to master the challenges of the future.

### The Mission of the Armed Forces

In **support of** the objectives of the 2004 **NDS** the Armed Forces conduct military activities **globally** to:

- **Protect** the United States against external attacks and aggression.
- **Prevent** conflict and surprise attacks.
- **Prevail** against adversaries.

